Background
Alexander Garcia hosted a San Diego social running group called Tuesday Waterfront Run. James Ades joined around August 2022, and over the following year Garcia received complaints that Ades was bothering members, particularly women. After Ades made an impromptu December 2023 speech about an affair with another member, Garcia messaged him the next day that he was no longer welcome at TWR events. Ades stayed away for a while but returned in March 2024; a run leader privately reminded him he was unwelcome, and when he remained, Garcia privately told him to leave and then announced to the group that Ades was there uninvited.
Around May 2024 Ades sued Garcia in small claims court for defamation, and in June 2024 Garcia requested a civil harassment restraining order under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6. At the August 2024 evidentiary hearing, Garcia testified he feared escalation but conceded Ades had sent only one or two lengthy messages and had never threatened him. During a break the parties reached an informal agreement: Garcia would dismiss the case, and Ades would not attend TWR for one year, not contact Garcia directly or through third parties, and stay away if they encountered each other. The court agreed to reserve on attorneys' fees and then dismissed without prejudice. Ades, in pro. per., moved for $9,193.30 in fees and costs under section 527.6(s); the trial court denied the motion as untimely and defective and found he was not the prevailing party because the case ended in a settlement.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal affirmed, assuming without deciding that the fee motion was timely and procedurally correct. It explained that section 527.6(s) authorizes fees for the prevailing party but does not define that term, and courts are not bound by section 1032(a)(4) when applying other fee statutes. The trial court instead must decide on a practical level whether a party received what it wanted from the litigation, and it may conclude that, practically speaking, there was no prevailing party. Whether a party prevailed and whether fees should be awarded are left to the trial court's broad discretion, reviewed only for abuse.
The appellate court agreed that, to the extent the trial court thought Ades needed to show something out of the ordinary, that was error because section 527.6(s) itself departs from the American rule and does not require proof that the CHRO request was frivolous or brought in bad faith. But the critical finding was that Ades was not the prevailing party, a conclusion the court deemed very reasonable if not compelling: the dismissal did not automatically mean Ades prevailed, and it resulted not from any persuasive legal argument he made but from his voluntary informal agreement to stay away from TWR and Garcia and not contact him. On a practical level Garcia obtained an express assurance in open court that Ades would leave him alone, something he did not have before. The court also rejected Ades's argument that the judge had signaled the agreement would not affect fees; the judge merely acknowledged the fee issue was not properly before her and never suggested a later motion would be meritorious.
Key Takeaways
- Dismissal of a civil harassment restraining order petition does not automatically make the defendant the prevailing party for attorney's fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6(s).
- Where dismissal follows the defendant's voluntary informal agreement to stay away from the petitioner, the trial court may reasonably find no prevailing party on a practical-level review of what each side obtained.
- Section 527.6(s) does not require a defendant to prove the underlying CHRO request was frivolous or brought in bad faith, but the defendant still must show he prevailed in the practical sense.
- A trial court's reservation of the fee issue for a later noticed motion is not a ruling or suggestion that the motion will be granted.
- Denial of fees under section 527.6(s) is reviewed for abuse of discretion, with deference to the trial court's prevailing-party assessment.
Why It Matters
The decision illustrates that prevailing-party status under section 527.6(s) is a practical, discretionary inquiry rather than a mechanical consequence of dismissal, especially when the dismissal follows a negotiated informal agreement rather than a merits ruling. It confirms that courts are not bound by the section 1032 cost-statute definition when applying a different fee statute.
The opinion also clarifies that section 527.6(s) codifies a departure from the American rule without requiring a showing of frivolousness or bad faith, while still affirming that a mutual arrangement producing dismissal without prejudice can support a reasonable finding that the defendant did not prevail. That guidance is useful for litigants and trial courts handling fee motions in civil harassment proceedings.
Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket