Background
Mother A.G. and Father J.R. appealed postjudgment orders terminating their parental rights to P.R., A.G., and I.R. The Orange County Social Services Agency had filed dependency petitions after each child's birth: P.R. in November 2016, A.G. in March 2024, and I.R. in May 2025. The juvenile court found the failure-to-protect allegation concerning P.R. true, found the amended failure-to-protect and sibling-abuse allegations concerning A.G. true, and found the allegations of I.R.'s petition true by a preponderance of the evidence. It removed all three children and initially ordered reunification services for P.R. and A.G. At I.R.'s disposition hearing, the court found by clear and convincing evidence under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13), that services need not be provided to Mother, and under subdivisions (b)(10) and (13), that services need not be provided to Father.
After this court issued a March 2025 writ directing the juvenile court to vacate an earlier services-termination order in A.G.'s case, a combined August 2025 hearing ended reunification services for both parents as to P.R. and A.G., with continued-removal findings under section 366.22(a)(1) for P.R. and section 366.21(f)(1) for A.G. A combined section 366.26 hearing for all three children was held in March 2026, about one month before In re Z.G. was filed. The court found P.R. specifically adoptable and A.G. and I.R. generally adoptable, terminated both parents' rights, and set adoption as the permanent plan.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal affirmed. Under Z.G., termination at a section 366.26 hearing requires both a likelihood-of-adoption finding and one additional finding under section 366.26(c)(1) — an order withholding reunification services, specified findings about an absent or nonvisiting parent, a felony conviction indicating unfitness, or continued removal coupled with terminated services. The juvenile court made the adoptability findings but none of the additional findings at the .26 hearing. The Agency's arguments that Z.G. was limited by its ineffective-assistance context and that express findings are unnecessary did not change that requirement.
Applying the reasonable-probability standard Z.G. assumed without deciding, the panel found the omission harmless. The August 2025 orders terminating services and continuing removal of P.R. and A.G. were virtually identical to the required additional findings, and both children remained removed at the .26 hearing. I.R.'s disposition findings bypassing services were identical to another statutory additional finding. Neither parent sought writ review of the services-termination orders or appealed I.R.'s disposition order. Given those unchallenged orders, the continued removals, and no change in the supporting evidence, the court found a reasonable probability the juvenile court would have made the requisite findings had it known of the need.
The panel rejected Mother's structural-error argument. She cited no authority treating the omission as structural, and Z.G. itself applied harmless-error analysis; none of the structural-error rationales in Conservatorship of E.A. applied. The record left no doubt as to the relevant additional findings for each child, and the parents could not use these appeals to challenge services orders they never challenged by writ or appeal.
Key Takeaways
- A likelihood-of-adoption finding alone does not authorize termination under section 366.26(c)(1); at least one additional statutory finding is required.
- Failure to repeat the additional findings at the .26 hearing is reviewed for harmless error, not treated as structural error.
- Earlier unchallenged orders terminating services and continuing removal can supply the equivalent of the required findings when the children remain removed and the evidence is unchanged.
- A disposition finding bypassing services can be identical to a required additional finding, but the omission still must be assessed for prejudice.
- Parents cannot use an appeal from termination orders to challenge services orders they failed to challenge by writ petition or appeal.
Why It Matters
The decision applies Z.G. to termination hearings held before that opinion clarified the need for express additional findings. It distinguishes the absence of findings at the final hearing from the absence of record support: earlier, unchallenged orders and unchanged circumstances can establish a reasonable probability the juvenile court would have made the findings if apprised of the requirement.
The ruling also explains why the omission was not structural here: the statutory basis could be identified for each child, and the parents had not preserved challenges to the antecedent services orders. The opinion affirms all three termination orders without suggesting final-hearing findings are optional or that every similar omission will be harmless.
Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket