Background
The Riverside County Department of Public Social Services filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition on February 10, 2026, concerning six-year-old Ra.A. and one-month-old A.A. The petition alleged failure to protect under subdivision (b) and lack of provisions for support under subdivision (g), based principally on an alleged February 4, 2026 domestic violence incident in which father allegedly punched mother and grabbed her face while the children were present, along with allegations of prior domestic violence, father's criminal history, and his incarceration.
At the February 11, 2026 detention hearing, the juvenile court detained the children from father, R.A., but allowed them to remain with mother, E.E., and granted a temporary restraining order. At the March 4, 2026 jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the court sustained the section 300, subdivision (b) allegation, struck the subdivision (g) allegation because father was no longer in custody, retained physical custody of the children with mother, and ordered family maintenance services for her.
The court also removed the children from father's custody under section 361, subdivision (c), granted a permanent restraining order against father expiring in March 2028, and permitted visitation only if father's criminal protective order was modified to allow it. The court nevertheless ordered reunification services for father, explaining that it wanted to give him tools to have contact with his children, and adopted the remaining recommendations. County counsel objected that father was not entitled to reunification services because the children remained with mother. DPSS appealed, asking that the order be corrected to provide enhancement services instead, while father asked the Court of Appeal to affirm.
The Court’s Holding
The Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division Two, agreed with DPSS and reversed the disposition order as to father. The court relied on section 16501, subdivision (h), which defines family reunification services as time-limited foster care services provided when a child cannot safely remain at home and needs temporary foster care while services reunite the family, and on section 16507, subdivision (b), which limits reunification services to a child placed in out-of-home care or in the care of a previously noncustodial parent under juvenile court supervision.
Because the children remained with mother, a custodial parent, their parental custody was not disrupted by a foster care placement and there was no statutory need to reunify the family. The court cited In re A.L., In re Destiny D., and In re C.S. for the principle that a parent not retaining custody is not entitled to reunification services when the child remains with the other custodial parent. The juvenile court therefore erred in ordering reunification services for father.
The Court of Appeal declined to direct an award of enhancement services. Enhancement services are child welfare services offered to the parent not retaining custody to enhance the child's relationship with that parent, but an order for them is discretionary under section 362, subdivision (a). The court reversed the disposition order as to father, remanded for a new disposition hearing, and directed the juvenile court to exercise its discretion on whether to offer enhancement services. In all other respects, the judgment was affirmed.
Key Takeaways
- Family reunification services are unavailable under section 16507, subdivision (b), when a child remains with a custodial parent rather than entering out-of-home care or the care of a previously noncustodial parent under juvenile court supervision.
- Removing children from one parent's custody does not by itself authorize reunification services when the children remain with the other custodial parent.
- Enhancement services may support a child's relationship with the parent who does not retain custody, but that parent is not automatically entitled to them; the juvenile court has discretion whether to order them.
- The appellate court reversed only the disposition as to father and remanded for a new disposition hearing; it affirmed the judgment in all other respects, including the orders concerning mother and the children.
- The juvenile court's separate orders granting a permanent restraining order against father and conditioning visitation on modification of his criminal protective order were not disturbed by the appellate disposition.
Why It Matters
The decision distinguishes the statutory purpose of reunification services, which address a family disrupted by foster care placement, from the juvenile court's broader authority under section 362 to make reasonable orders addressing the conditions requiring court supervision when children remain with one custodial parent.
The remand also preserves an important limit on DPSS's requested relief: although the agency sought enhancement services for father, the appellate court required the juvenile court to decide that question independently on remand, leaving open whether father will receive those services.
Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket