Background
Jose Manuel Ceja Ceja, through retained counsel, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on October 16, 2026, while detained in ICE custody at the Adelanto Detention Facility in the Central District of California. The petition raised two claims: that his purported agreement to voluntary removal may not have been made freely and with full understanding in violation of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, and that his detention was illegal. Counsel concurrently moved for a temporary restraining order to enjoin his removal from the Central District and secure his immediate release.
On October 19, 2026, the parties consented to proceed before a Magistrate Judge for all purposes. Respondents filed a combined answer and opposition on October 22, notifying the court that Ceja Ceja had been removed from the United States on October 16 — the day the petition was filed — and arguing the petition should be dismissed as moot. Petitioner's reply on October 26 acknowledged the removal to Mexico but argued it did not resolve the underlying allegations of unlawful detention, without identifying any remaining issues or available relief.
Respondents' exhibits showed Ceja Ceja was arrested on October 10, 2026, and received notice that same day of his intended October 16 removal based on reinstatement of a prior removal order. The court noted the Clerk's Office issued a General Order 26-05 notice requiring at least two court days' notice of removal, but it issued at 5:10 p.m. on October 16, and it was unclear whether removal occurred before or after. Given the timing, the six days' advance notice, and counsel's failure to argue the removal violated any court order, the court did not at this time find a violation.
The Court’s Holding
The court held the action was subject to dismissal not because removal alone establishes the detention was lawful, but because the issues were moot and no relief remained. As to Ground One, the exhibits established the removal was effected not voluntarily but pursuant to reinstatement of a prior removal order, and counsel offered no evidence of voluntary removal; moreover, district courts lack habeas jurisdiction to review a removal order or its reinstatement, which lies exclusively with the courts of appeals under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5), citing Iasu v. Smith.
As to Ground Two, challenging the detention itself, the court held that because Ceja Ceja was no longer in custody after his removal, any claim going to the propriety of his detention was moot. Relying on the Article III case-or-controversy requirement that subsists through all stages of litigation, the court cited Spencer v. Kemna, Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., Abdala v. I.N.S., and Picrin-Peron v. Rison.
The court denied the pending petition and the TRO motion as moot and directed that judgment be entered accordingly. The decision was issued by Chief U.S. Magistrate Judge Karen L. Stevenson on October 28, 2026.
Key Takeaways
- A habeas petition challenging immigration detention becomes moot once the petitioner is removed from the United States, leaving no live case or controversy for the court to resolve.
- District courts lack habeas jurisdiction to review a removal order or its reinstatement; that jurisdiction belongs exclusively to the courts of appeals under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5).
- A petitioner claiming voluntary, unconstitutional removal must offer evidence supporting that claim; here the record showed involuntary removal and that he refused to sign removal documents.
- Counsel seeking to keep a habeas case alive after a client's removal must identify specific remaining issues and redressable relief, not ask the court to search for collateral consequences on its own.
- The court did not at this time find the same-day removal violated the general order requiring advance notice, given six days' prior notice and no argument that the removal was improper.
Why It Matters
The decision illustrates the practical finality of rapid removals in immigration habeas cases: when a petitioner is removed the same day he files, the district court's ability to grant meaningful relief evaporates almost immediately. Mootness doctrine, not the merits of the detention, typically disposes of such cases, and the jurisdictional bar prevents district courts from reviewing reinstated removal orders.
The ruling also leaves open the tension between expedited removal and court oversight, as the court noted but did not resolve whether the same-day removal complied with the general order requiring advance notice. Practitioners should note that failing to identify concrete collateral consequences after a client's removal results in dismissal, and challenges to the removal order itself must be pursued in the court of appeals.
Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket