Background
In 2006, when he was 15 years old, Leroy Tyus Jr. joined Kevin Roach in what Tyus understood to be a debt collection. During a brief car ride, Roach told Tyus they were going to “get some money.” At the destination, Roach — not Tyus — shot and killed victim Dustin Diaz while Tyus stood unarmed 10 to 20 feet away. Tyus was charged with murder and pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter in 2010, receiving a 21-year sentence.
In 2023, Tyus petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, which provides relief for defendants convicted under now-abrogated theories of imputed malice such as felony murder. The People agreed Tyus stated a prima facie case. At the evidentiary hearing, the trial court found the People had not proven Tyus guilty of murder under current law, vacated his conviction, and dismissed the case. The People appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Fourth District affirmed the grant of Tyus’s petition but remanded on the remedy. On the merits, the court held the People failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Tyus directly aided and abetted murder with intent to kill. The only direct evidence of Tyus’s intent was his own testimony (given as a cooperating witness) that he believed they were going to collect a debt. The People themselves characterized Tyus’s belief this way in their briefs. Circumstantial evidence — that Tyus had previously served as a lookout for a burglary — was equally consistent with intent to participate in a taking of property, not a taking of life.
However, the trial court erred by dismissing the case when no remaining charges existed. Section 1172.6, subdivision (e) requires redesignation of the conviction as the underlying felony when murder was charged generically and no target offense was separately charged. The court remanded for redesignation as attempted robbery — the crime consistent with Tyus’s stated intent to take money.
Key Takeaways
- At a section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing, the burden is entirely on the prosecution to prove the petitioner guilty of murder under current law — the petitioner need not prove anything once a prima facie case is found.
- A guilty plea to manslaughter does not by itself establish the defendant is guilty of murder under a still-valid theory; the Legislature added manslaughter to section 1172.6 precisely because defendants plea to avoid the risk of conviction on now-abrogated theories.
- When granting a section 1172.6 petition where the target offense was not separately charged, courts must redesignate the conviction under subdivision (e) — dismissal is not an option under the statute.
- The prosecution’s agreement that a petition states a prima facie case places the burden on them at the evidentiary hearing; they cannot later argue the hearing should not have occurred.
Why It Matters
This decision is significant for the thousands of California resentencing petitions currently moving through the courts under section 1172.6. It clarifies two important points: first, that the People bear a heavy burden at evidentiary hearings and cannot satisfy it through the bare fact of a guilty plea or by pointing to how they prosecuted a co-defendant. Second, it reminds trial courts that section 1172.6 does not provide for outright dismissal — even a successful petitioner emerges with a redesignated conviction.
For defense attorneys handling section 1172.6 petitions for accomplices who pled to manslaughter, this case demonstrates that testimony the defendant gave as a cooperating witness — stating he lacked intent to kill — can be the very evidence that defeats the prosecution’s burden at the evidentiary hearing.