Background
Charles Dell Riel was convicted in 1988 of first degree murder, robbery, and kidnapping. The jury found true robbery-murder and kidnapping-murder special circumstances and two prior-prison-term allegations, then returned a death verdict. The trial court imposed that sentence. On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court struck a redundant prior-prison-term finding and otherwise affirmed the judgment.
Legislation effective in 2020 eliminated most one-year enhancements under former Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b), and later legislation made that change retroactive. Section 1172.75 declares covered enhancements legally invalid and provides for recall and resentencing after the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation identifies affected prisoners and the sentencing court verifies the enhancement. In 2023, Riel filed a motion to strike his special circumstance findings or, in the alternative, modify the judgment. He argued that the trial court could and should strike the special circumstance findings under section 1385 or modify the judgment under section 190.4, subdivision (e) to impose a sentence of life without the possibility of parole instead of death.
The superior court initially denied Riel's 2023 motion as premature because CDCR had not referred the matter to it pursuant to section 1172.75. After the People conceded on appeal that a referral had occurred, a different appellate panel remanded for consideration of the motion. On remand, Riel challenged the reasoning of People v. Dixon and alternatively requested resentencing under section 1172.1. The superior court ruled: 'The Court finds the inability to address the circumstances as the finding was a death verdict by jury trial, however, the Court will strike the Prison Prior.'
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal affirmed. It explained that, thus far, the published opinions addressing this issue have all agreed that section 1509 prevents using section 1172.75 to reduce a death sentence. Section 1509, subdivision (a), makes a petition for writ of habeas corpus the exclusive procedure for collateral attack on a judgment of death. Because a section 1172.75 proceeding is a proceeding other than a direct appeal, Riel's effort to challenge the propriety of his death sentence fell within that restriction.
The court noted that this issue is currently on appeal in our Supreme Court and that we are aware of no court of appeal that has concluded a death sentence may be revisited under section 1172.75. It acknowledged that the question was close and that the Supreme Court might soon decide differently. Nevertheless, it found no persuasive reason to depart from Dixon, Cain, and Millsap. It therefore did not decide the People's separate argument that section 1172.75 itself, independent of section 1509, does not authorize resentencing in death-penalty cases.
The alternative request under section 1172.1 also failed. Riel argued briefly in the alternative that the trial court should address his request for recall and resentencing under section 1172.1. The court is not required to respond to a defendant's request for resentencing under this provision, and as such, there is no basis for us to order a response. The order is affirmed.
Key Takeaways
- The court followed published authority holding that section 1509 makes habeas corpus the exclusive procedure for a collateral attack on a death judgment.
- Riel's section 1172.75 proceeding could secure removal of the invalid prior-prison-term enhancement but could not be used to challenge the propriety of his death sentence.
- The panel expressly recognized that the issue is close and remains subject to a potentially different resolution by the California Supreme Court.
- The court did not resolve whether section 1172.75 independently bars death-penalty resentencing without regard to section 1509.
- Section 1172.1 did not support an order compelling the superior court to respond to Riel's alternative resentencing request.
Why It Matters
The decision illustrates how courts are separating the narrow task of removing an invalid enhancement from broader attempts to reopen a capital judgment. Although Riel obtained the enhancement relief reflected in the superior court's order, the appellate court would not convert that remedy into a route for replacing death with life without parole.
The opinion also leaves the central statutory controversy expressly provisional. By following existing published decisions while acknowledging possible Supreme Court reconsideration, the panel resolved this appeal without claiming to settle the broader question finally. Its treatment of section 1172.1 additionally confirms that Riel received no appellate order requiring the trial court to act on that alternative request.
Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket