Background
Ali Hassana, a citizen of Chad, arrived in Canada on February 25, 2019, to seek asylum. The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness alleged that he was inadmissible under paragraph 34(1)(f) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) because of his membership in the Patriotic Salvation Movement (PSM) between 2004 and 2015. Mr. Hassana maintained that he was not a PSM member within that provision’s meaning: he said he joined an affiliated branch after the PSM had been reorganized as a political party legally represented in Chad’s parliament.
On November 5, 2024, the Immigration Division (ID) of the Immigration and Refugee Board found Mr. Hassana inadmissible under paragraph 34(1)(f), in conjunction with paragraphs 34(1)(b) and (b.1), and issued a removal order. It found that the PSM had engaged in subversion of a democratic process, that Mr. Hassana had been a member, and that he could not rely on duress. The ID’s approach followed pre-Mason jurisprudence. After the ID hearing, however, Justice Grammond released Ali v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2025 FC 1682, which found that approach unreasonable. Madam Justice Azmudeh therefore requested submissions on Ali’s potential impact.
The Court’s Holding
The Court allowed the judicial review because the ID’s reasons were unreasonable. It agreed with Justice Grammond’s analysis in Ali: the ID had not engaged with any nexus between Mr. Hassana and actual danger to Canada’s security and had disregarded non-refoulement. The merits were reviewed for reasonableness under Vavilov, requiring an internally coherent analysis justified against the relevant factual and legal constraints, not substitution of the Court’s preferred outcome.
Drawing on Mason v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 SCC 21, Ali, and Ahamba v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2026 FC 498, the Court held that paragraph 3(3)(f) of IRPA makes international human rights instruments a mandatory interpretive constraint. Article 33 of the Refugee Convention protects refugees against return to specified threats, subject to the Article 33(2) exceptions. Accordingly, section 34’s inadmissibility grounds cannot be interpreted so broadly that their presumptions of danger capture people who pose no actual threat to Canada. For paragraph 34(1)(f), membership must retain a rational link to danger to Canada’s security; it cannot remain a purely formalistic finding.
The Court rejected the Minister’s jurisdictional, admissibility-versus-removal, and absurdity arguments. Considering non-refoulement as an interpretive tool does not require a full forward-looking individualized risk assessment or turn the ID hearing into a pre-removal risk assessment. Nor do later “safety valves” cure an unreasonable interpretation. The Court suggested that the ID might consider whether the person’s act, or the act allegedly committed by the organization, presumptively suggests danger to Canada, while leaving the precise approach to the ID. Because unreasonableness disposed of the application, it did not address the alleged procedural-fairness breach.
Key Takeaways
- The ID must consider non-refoulement when interpreting section 34, even if the parties do not raise it.
- Membership-based inadmissibility requires a rational link to danger to Canada’s security, not merely a broad or formal association.
- This interpretive duty is distinct from an individualized removal-risk assessment.
- The Court certified no question because the underlying international-law issue is settled.
Why It Matters
The judgment reinforces that security-inadmissibility decisions must be justified against Canada’s international obligations from the outset. It also distinguishes Slepcsik, which concerned cessation and reavailment, from section 34 proceedings that can exclude a person from refugee protection before the claim’s merits are assessed.
The Court declined both proposed certified questions under subsection 74(d) of IRPA. Although how international law affects particular cases remains for tribunals, whether it constrains section 34 is settled; the Court also cited Wahab, 2026 FCA 140, as confirming that position. The matter returns to the ID for determination by a differently constituted panel, with no certified question.