Background
Pina Zawin Hovsepian, a Syrian national, was recognized as a Convention Refugee by Canada and granted permanent residence upon her arrival in September 2017 through the private sponsorship program. However, just four months after obtaining refugee protection, she returned to Syria to pursue a legal dispute with her ex-husband over ownership of a bookstore. When the dispute was resolved in March 2018, she did not return to Canada. Instead, she remained in Syria for several years, living in a house awarded to her by a local church, working as an English tutor, and remarrying. She also renewed her Syrian passport in November 2021.
Upon her return to Canada in October 2022, a report was issued recommending referral to the Immigration Division for failure to comply with residency requirements. Her appeal to the Immigration Appeal Division was dismissed in May 2023. That same month, the Minister applied to the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) to cease her refugee protection on two grounds: voluntary reavailment of her country of nationality’s protection under paragraph 108(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 (IRPA), and voluntary re-establishment in Syria under paragraph 108(1)(d).
On April 8, 2025, the RPD granted the Minister’s application on the re-establishment ground, finding on a balance of probabilities that Hovsepian had voluntarily re-established herself in Syria from January 2018 to March 2020, when COVID-19 border closures intervened. The RPD also found her account of the bookstore dispute not credible and determined that a letter from a Syrian lawyer purporting to explain the necessity of her presence in Syria was vague and unpersuasive. Hovsepian sought judicial review of that decision.
The Court’s Holding
Justice Lafrenière dismissed the application for judicial review, finding the RPD’s decision reasonable in all respects. The Court held that the RPD’s analysis of the evidence was based on sound legal principles and that no reviewable error had been established. The Court reiterated that its role on judicial review is not to reassess the merits or reweigh the evidence, but only to determine whether the decision-maker made a reviewable error.
The Court rejected Hovsepian’s argument that the RPD had improperly disregarded the Syrian lawyer’s letter without giving specific reasons. The RPD had in fact addressed the letter, finding it vague and insufficient to explain why her physical presence in Syria was required for appeal proceedings — particularly given that the underlying court dispute had been resolved by March 2018 yet she remained in Syria for years thereafter. The RPD’s finding that her conduct — including no ties or assets in Canada, no return ticket to Canada, and years of continuous residence in Syria — was wholly inconsistent with that of a refugee fearing persecution was upheld as reasonable.
The Court also rejected the argument that the RPD had confused itself by referencing paragraph 120 of the UNHCR Handbook (relating to reavailment) in a re-establishment analysis. The Court found the reference was made merely to note that a return to a country of persecution for certain compelling personal reasons, such as completing divorce proceedings, may be deemed involuntary — a circumstance that did not apply on the facts before it.
Key Takeaways
- Voluntary re-establishment in a country of persecution under paragraph 108(1)(d) of the IRPA can be established where a refugee returns, remains for an extended period, builds a new life (employment, marriage, housing), and severs meaningful ties with Canada.
- A refugee’s claimed necessity for returning to their country of persecution — such as pursuing litigation — must be supported by credible and specific evidence; a vague lawyer’s letter asserting urgency is insufficient to rebut a finding of voluntary re-establishment.
- Courts applying the reasonableness standard on judicial review will not substitute their own assessment of the evidence for that of the RPD, and a finding of implausibility or lack of credibility by the RPD will stand where it is rationally supported by the record.
- Continuous residence in the country of persecution for years after the asserted purpose of the return was fulfilled strongly supports a finding that re-establishment was voluntary.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the principle that Convention Refugee status is not a permanent entitlement immune from changed circumstances. Where a recognized refugee voluntarily returns to and re-establishes themselves in their country of persecution — building a new life, remarrying, and working — Canadian authorities may cease that protection under the IRPA. The case serves as a clear warning to refugees that extended voluntary returns to their home countries, particularly those accompanied by severed ties to Canada, can jeopardize their protected status regardless of the reasons initially offered for the return.
The decision also underscores the high evidentiary bar applicants face when challenging cessation findings on judicial review. Evidence purporting to justify a return must be specific and credible; general or vague documentation will not suffice to overcome a well-reasoned RPD finding of voluntary re-establishment.