Background
Olga Lev was denied eligibility for the Canada Recovery Caregiving Benefit and Canada Recovery Sickness Benefit. On March 5, 2026, the Canada Revenue Agency rejected her request for a second review of that decision, citing a 30-day deadline that had passed. On March 6, 2026, Lev contacted the CRA and asked about her options. She was told she could either file an application for judicial review or seek assistance from her Member of Parliament.
Instead of immediately pursuing judicial review, Lev decided to seek help from her Member of Parliament’s office, hoping to resolve the matter without court involvement. After approximately three weeks, the MP’s office responded. On April 13, 2026—approximately 39 days after the CRA’s decision—Lev was informed that the CRA would not reopen her case and that she would need to proceed with judicial review. She filed her motion for an extension of time on April 27, 2026, well beyond the 30-day statutory deadline under section 18.1(2) of the Federal Courts Act.
The Court’s Holding
Justice Benoit M. Duchesne dismissed Lev’s motion for an extension of time. The court applied the four-part test from Hennelly (1999 CanLII 8190 (FCA)) for assessing whether an extension should be granted. On the first prong—whether Lev demonstrated a continuing intention to pursue judicial review—the court found she had not. The court noted that pursuing alternative remedies (such as MP assistance) while avoiding court involvement does not satisfy this requirement. Her affidavit explicitly stated she sought to resolve the matter “without involving the Court,” which demonstrated that during the critical 30-day period, her intention was not to pursue judicial review. No steps toward judicial review were taken before the April 4, 2026 deadline expired.
On the second prong—potential merit—the court found Lev’s proposed notice of application fatally deficient. It merely alleged the CRA’s decision was unreasonable and procedurally unfair without pleading any specific facts or explaining why the decision was unreasonable or how her procedural rights were breached. On the third prong, Lev led no evidence that the Crown would not suffer prejudice from the delay. On the fourth prong, while the court acknowledged that seeking MP assistance might initially seem reasonable, it found this explanation became unreasonable upon consideration that Members of Parliament have no legal authority or ability to reverse or interfere with an administrative decision. The proper recourse for challenging an administrative decision is through the courts, not through political representatives.
Key Takeaways
- Statutory time limits for judicial review are not discretionary and exist “in the public interest, in order to bring finality to administrative decisions”; courts approach extensions carefully and on a principled basis.
- A continuing intention to pursue judicial review must be demonstrated before the 30-day deadline expires and cannot be inferred from the mere fact that judicial review is later filed after delay.
- Pursuing alternative remedies (such as seeking help from a Member of Parliament) instead of timely commencing judicial review negates the existence of a continuing intention to seek court review.
- A proposed application for judicial review must plead specific facts; bald allegations of unreasonableness or procedural unfairness, without supporting material facts, do not satisfy the “potential merit” requirement.
- Members of Parliament cannot reverse administrative decisions; seeking MP intervention as an alternative to judicial review within the statutory window is not a reasonable explanation for missing the deadline.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the strict application of statutory time limits for judicial review and illustrates when courts will refuse to grant extensions. It is particularly important for individuals who believe they have been denied social benefits or other administrative decisions—seeking intervention from elected officials, though intuitive, will not extend or protect the judicial review deadline. The judgment makes clear that once an applicant becomes aware of an adverse administrative decision, the clock for commencing judicial review begins immediately, and the only legally viable path to challenge it is through the courts.
The decision also sets a high bar for demonstrating “continuing intention”—the requirement is not merely that judicial review eventually be filed, but that evidence shows the applicant was pursuing that specific remedy during the statutory window. For self-represented litigants and advisors, the case underscores that proposed applications must particularize grounds for review with specific facts, not merely conclusory assertions of illegality or unfairness.