Background
Yousif Sabah Mansoor Mansoor fled religious persecution in Baghdad, Iraq, in September 2014 at age 18. After being recognized as a Convention refugee by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Lebanon, he entered Canada in May 2015 as a permanent resident sponsored by the Asmaro Chaldean Society. On August 29, 2015, he returned to Iraq to care for his critically ill mother, who had been hospitalized in Erbil, Kurdistan, because his father had health problems and could not adequately care for her. He stayed just over five months and then returned to Canada. He has not returned to Iraq since, although he renewed his Iraqi passport in 2017 to see his parents during their visit to the United States and to vacation in Cuba with friends.
A member of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) determined that Mansoor’s refugee protection had ceased under paragraph 108(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act because he had voluntarily reavailed himself of Iraq’s protection. The RPD relied on his return to Iraq and his later passport renewal and travel. Mansoor sought judicial review, arguing that the decision was unreasonable and procedurally unfair.
The Court’s Holding
Justice Brouwer allowed the application and set aside the cessation decision. Applying the reasonableness framework in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, the Court emphasized that decisions with particularly harsh consequences require reasons reflecting those stakes. The governing reavailment test, drawn from Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Galindo Camayo, 2022 FCA 50, has three conjunctive elements: voluntary action, intention to reavail oneself of the national state’s protection, and actually obtaining that protection. The Minister bears the onus of establishing each element on a balance of probabilities. Acquiring and using a national passport can create a rebuttable presumption of intended reavailment, particularly where the passport is used to return to the country of nationality.
The Court found unreasonable errors on all three elements. On voluntariness, the RPD failed to engage with Galindo Camayo’s recognition that caring for an ill family member may be a compelling reason for return, unlike a vacation or visit with friends. Instead, it effectively required evidence that Mansoor had been “forced or pressured.” It also misunderstood the passport chronology: Mansoor travelled to Iraq in 2015 on his original passport, issued before he fled, whereas the renewal occurred in 2017, two years after his only return trip.
On intent, the RPD improperly required Mansoor to show that his presence in Iraq was “absolutely necessary,” rather than assessing his explanation from his own perspective to determine subjective intent. The Court agreed with Ahmad v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 8, that an objective absolute-necessity standard is inconsistent with Galindo Camayo. The RPD also speculated that Mansoor’s uncle’s wife could again care for his parents, without evidence of her continuing willingness or availability, and failed to address his evidence that his family decided he should return and that he believed doing so was his filial duty.
The knowledge analysis was also flawed. The RPD relied on what Mansoor “should have known,” although Galindo Camayo permits evidence of a refugee’s lack of subjective knowledge to rebut the presumption. It assessed his maturity at age 27, when the cessation hearing occurred, rather than at age 19 when he returned to Iraq or 21 when he renewed his passport. Its finding that he could have consulted former counsel from an earlier RPD hearing was unsupported: there was no earlier hearing or previous counsel, because he had been resettled through private sponsorship. The inference that his failure to seek advice showed he knowingly accepted the risks was unintelligible.
Finally, the RPD imposed an elevated requirement that Mansoor have been “in hiding.” His evidence was that he remained in Erbil rather than unsafe Baghdad, kept a low profile, used the same driver, and went out only for food, medication, or hospital visits. Following Gorgis v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2025 FC 117, the Court held that the relevant question was whether he took precautionary measures, not whether he was actually hiding.
Key Takeaways
- All three reavailment elements must be established; passport-based presumptions remain rebuttable.
- A seriously ill family member may supply a compelling reason for returning, and subjective intent cannot be displaced by an “absolute necessity” or “should have known” standard.
- Precautionary measures matter; a refugee need not prove actual hiding.
- The Court did not decide procedural fairness, removed the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness as co-respondent, and certified no question.
Why It Matters
The judgment reinforces that cessation analysis must address the refugee’s actual circumstances, evidence, and subjective intent. Unless the Minister withdraws the cessation application, a different RPD panel must redetermine the matter in light of these reasons.