Background
Serge Murenzi, a Rwandan citizen of Tutsi ethnicity, entered Canada in 2007 and was recognized as a Convention refugee in 2008. His parents and two siblings had been killed in connection with the Rwandan genocide and its aftermath. Before leaving Rwanda, he had lived with and been assisted by businessman Rwigara, whose family later experienced difficulties with Rwandan authorities.
Beginning in 2014, Murenzi accumulated several convictions, including repeated failures to comply with conditions. In 2018, he was convicted of procuring, human trafficking, and causing bodily harm for conduct dating from 2010 to 2014, and received a four-year prison sentence. Those convictions led to findings of inadmissibility for serious criminality and a removal order. After Murenzi completed a six-month residential alcohol-treatment program in December 2023, a ministerial delegate nevertheless decided in April 2025 that he remained a present and future danger to the Canadian public, faced no established personalized risk in Rwanda, and could therefore be removed under paragraph 115(2)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act despite the statutory principle of non-refoulement.
Murenzi sought judicial review, arguing that the delegate unreasonably discounted his rehabilitation and improperly assessed the danger of returning him to Rwanda. He also alleged that the decision infringed section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. He did not pursue any procedural-fairness argument at the hearing.
The Court’s Holding
Justice Gascon dismissed the application for judicial review without costs. Applying reasonableness review, the Court held that the delegate’s detailed reasons were rational, coherent, and responsive to the relevant evidence and legal constraints. The Court emphasized that its role was not to reweigh the record or substitute its own factual assessment for the delegate’s.
The delegate reasonably considered Murenzi’s alcohol treatment, supporting letters, volunteer work, correctional and parole assessments, repeated breaches of conditions, and criminal history. It was open to the delegate to find the rehabilitation evidence insufficient, particularly because alcohol use was not the only factor associated with Murenzi’s criminality and the record reflected continuing compliance and recidivism concerns.
The delegate also reasonably found that Murenzi had not established a personalized risk in Rwanda. Although he relied on the Rwandan authorities’ treatment of members of the Rwigara family, the evidence did not show that he had maintained contact or close ties with that family after leaving Rwanda in 2007, or that Rwandan authorities had any current interest in him. The Court therefore upheld the reasonableness of the delegate’s paragraph 115(2)(a) decision permitting removal notwithstanding non-refoulement protection; it did not itself issue a removal order. No question of general importance was certified.
Key Takeaways
- A refugee who is inadmissible for serious criminality may fall within the paragraph 115(2)(a) exception to non-refoulement if the ministerial decision-maker reasonably finds that the person remains a danger to the Canadian public and that removal is otherwise justified.
- Evidence of treatment and positive conduct does not compel a finding of rehabilitation where the decision-maker reasonably addresses that evidence alongside serious offences, repeated non-compliance, and other risk factors.
- A return-risk claim must be tied to the applicant’s current, individualized circumstances; evidence that former associates or their relatives were targeted may be insufficient without proof of continuing ties or official interest in the applicant.
Why It Matters
The decision illustrates the deferential role of a reviewing court when examining a ministerial delegate’s danger opinion under paragraph 115(2)(a). Where the reasons meaningfully address rehabilitation, prospective danger, return risk, humanitarian considerations, and Charter concerns, disagreement over the weight assigned to the evidence will generally not justify judicial intervention.
It also clarifies the procedural effect of such a judgment: dismissing judicial review leaves intact the administrative decision that permits removal despite non-refoulement protection, but the Court does not itself order or directly carry out the person’s removal.