Background
Tiffany Savard, also known as Tiffany Jérôme, applied for judicial review of a February 4, 2026 decision by a Canada Revenue Agency officer refusing her request for a second review of her eligibility for the Canada Emergency Response Benefit and Canada Recovery Caregiving Benefit. She had received CERB payments for six four-week periods from April 12 to August 30, 2020, and CRCB payments for 16 one-week periods from September 27, 2020 to January 10, 2021. The CRA’s May 29, 2024 initial letter requested supporting paperwork within 45 days and was uploaded to her MyAccount. After she did not respond, her file was automatically determined ineligible on November 13, 2024.
On January 24, 2025, the CRA issued its first-review “No Reply Decision,” again finding her ineligible because she had not answered the initial letter. The accompanying letter, posted to MyAccount that day, stated that a second review could be requested within 30 days. Redetermination letters demanding repayment followed on January 30. Savard said account-notification emails were diverted to a junk-mail folder she did not regularly monitor. She first saw the No Reply Letter when she accessed MyAccount on March 9, 2025, called the CRA on March 12, and submitted documents and her second-review request on March 14—19 days after the February 23 deadline.
The CRA’s policy allowed officers to consider explanations for late requests, with examples including natural disasters, postal strikes, misdirected correspondence, illness, late-received documents, and continuous efforts to resolve a case. Savard also relied on the March call and an alleged July 18, 2025 call about processing times, although the court noted that the records did not disclose the July call. Following a February 2, 2026 review, the officer found no valid explanation for the delay. The February 4 refusal was the decision under review. Justice Giuseppina D’Agostino heard the self-represented applicant’s challenge in Ottawa on September 29, 2026.
The Court’s Holding
The Federal Court dismissed the application and awarded no costs. It addressed procedural fairness on a standard akin to correctness, asking whether Savard knew the case to meet and had an opportunity to respond before an impartial decision maker. The decision itself was reviewed for reasonableness under Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, with Savard bearing the burden of establishing unreasonableness.
On notice, the court found that the CRA used the correct email address, posted the No Reply Letter to MyAccount, and took the necessary steps to communicate through the designated electronic channels. Savard did not dispute that the correspondence was sent. Her junk-mail filtering might explain why she did not see it, but did not establish a failure by the CRA to give notice; the CRA was not responsible for her email service’s filtering. The court therefore found the notice requirement satisfied on these facts.
The court also rejected the legitimate-expectations argument raised at the hearing. Such an expectation requires a clear, unambiguous, and unqualified procedural representation and cannot guarantee a substantive outcome. Neither the March call notes nor Savard’s account of the July call established a clear commitment to conduct a second review despite the expired deadline. At most, the July representation gave general processing-time information. The CRA nevertheless considered her materials when deciding whether to proceed.
On reasonableness, the court held that the officer considered Savard’s explanation and assessed an extension under the policy rather than treating the deadline as an absolute bar. The officer found her failure to monitor CRA communications insufficient. Later supporting documents and the financial consequences did not themselves justify the delay, and the officer’s task was whether to permit a late second review, not to reassess benefit eligibility. The court likewise found no fettering of discretion: subsection 31(1) of the Canada Recovery Benefits Act permits further time, and an unfavourable exercise of discretion is not a failure to exercise it. Having found no reviewable error, the court did not consider whether remittal would be pointless because the outcome was inevitable.
Key Takeaways
- Proper use of MyAccount and the associated email address satisfied notice here; diversion to the recipient’s junk-mail folder did not establish a CRA notice failure.
- General or equivocal statements about review status or processing times did not create a legitimate expectation of a second review after the deadline.
- The officer assessed the late-request explanation under the policy, so the refusal was neither an automatic application of the 30-day limit nor fettering of discretion.
- The ruling concerned permission for a late second review, not a fresh determination of Savard’s underlying CERB or CRCB eligibility.
Why It Matters
The decision illustrates how electronic-notice, legitimate-expectations, deadline-extension, and fettering arguments may be assessed in challenges to refusals of late benefit reviews. Its conclusions were tied to this record, including the CRA’s use of the designated channels and the officer’s consideration of Savard’s explanation.
It also distinguishes an unfavourable discretionary decision from a refusal to exercise discretion. Because the application failed on procedural fairness and reasonableness, the court had no occasion to decide the remedial question of an inevitable outcome.