Background
Shivanshu, an Indian citizen, came to Canada on a study permit to attend Conestoga College. After his studies, he applied for a post-graduation work permit (PGWP) to remain in Canada with his wife. However, the PGWP application included fraudulent documents: a transcript and completion of studies letter from Canadore College, a different institution than the one Shivanshu actually attended.
Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) verified the documents and found them to be fraudulent. An officer determined that Shivanshu was inadmissible for misrepresentation under section 40(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) for a period of five years. The officer issued a procedural fairness letter, and Shivanshu responded, claiming he had hired an immigration consultant to prepare his application and was unaware of what documents were submitted. He asserted he should be excused under the “innocent misrepresentation” exception.
Shivanshu sought judicial review, arguing the officer’s decision was unreasonable and had ignored his evidence and failed to consider the innocent misrepresentation exception.
The Court’s Holding
Justice Fuhrer upheld the officer’s decision as reasonable. The court confirmed that misrepresentation inadmissibility under IRPA section 40 requires two elements: (1) a misrepresentation of material facts, and (2) the misrepresentation could have induced an error in administering the IRPA. No intent to deceive is required. While a narrow exception exists for innocent misrepresentation—applying only in “truly extraordinary circumstances” where an applicant honestly and reasonably believed they were not misrepresenting material facts—this exception does not apply where the applicant failed to conduct due diligence.
The court found that Shivanshu had not exercised adequate due diligence. He consulted multiple consultants who advised him a spousal work permit was impossible, yet he ultimately retained a consultant without verifying their credentials or reviewing what documents would be submitted. He provided cash payments without obtaining a formal representation agreement and made no effort to confirm the authenticity of the documents submitted on his behalf. The officer properly emphasized that applicants bear responsibility for ensuring the integrity of their own applications, even when using representatives.
Because Shivanshu lacked due diligence in retaining his consultant and reviewing the application, the officer was not required to consider the innocent misrepresentation exception. The judge found the officer’s reasons demonstrated justification, intelligibility, and transparency, with a logical analytical chain. The application for judicial review was dismissed.
Key Takeaways
- Applicants must conduct reasonable due diligence when retaining immigration consultants and representatives, including verifying their integrity and reviewing the contents of submissions made on their behalf, even if this requires follow-up inquiries.
- The innocent misrepresentation exception to IRPA section 40 is extremely narrow and does not apply where an applicant has failed to exercise due diligence; lack of due diligence precludes consideration of the exception entirely.
- Misrepresentation inadmissibility requires no proof of intent to deceive; the two-part test focuses on whether material facts were misrepresented and whether the misrepresentation could induce an error in IRPA administration.
- Immigration officers are entitled to draw reasonable inferences from an applicant’s conduct, including failure to question a consultant about critical details, and this evidentiary assessment will not be overturned on judicial review merely because another inference was possible.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces that immigration law prioritizes system integrity and places substantial responsibility on applicants to verify information submitted on their behalf. Many applicants rely on immigration consultants—some of whom are unscrupulous or incompetent—yet this judgment makes clear that reliance on a consultant does not excuse an applicant from conducting due diligence. The decision has significant implications for applicants who work with representatives: they cannot passively assume their consultants are acting in good faith or will submit accurate documents. The narrow scope of the innocent misrepresentation exception means applicants in Shivanshu’s position—who ignored red flags, paid cash without formality, and never reviewed what was actually submitted—will find little protection in Canadian immigration law.
The decision also illustrates the harsh but predictable consequences of using unvetted immigration consultants. Shivanshu was left inadmissible to Canada for five years based on documents he claims he did not know had been submitted, a consequence that flows directly from his failure to verify the consultant’s legitimacy and to maintain control over his own application. For legal practitioners advising clients on immigration matters, the case underscores the importance of counseling clients about due diligence obligations and the limited protection available when third parties fail them.