Background
Brian Wilson was convicted of first-degree murder, first-degree conspiracy, and first-degree criminal solicitation for arranging the killing of Allen Cannon after Cannon and his nephew attempted to rob Wilson. The prosecution presented a recorded call involving Wilson, testimony from four jailhouse witnesses who said Wilson admitted hiring the shooter, communications between intermediaries, and other evidence. On direct appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court held that admitting text messages from the nephew’s phone was error but harmless because the remaining evidence was extensive, and it affirmed the convictions.
Wilson later sought postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. He alleged that trial counsel was ineffective because of a purported conflict involving a former client and because counsel failed to object to evidence; that the State withheld cooperation agreements with jailhouse witnesses; and that shooter Eric Ray’s later manslaughter plea was newly discovered evidence. Wilson also requested an evidentiary hearing. The Superior Court denied the motion without a hearing, and Wilson appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed. It held that Wilson had not established an actual conflict of interest because the record did not show that counsel’s prior representation of the State’s proposed witness was substantially related to Wilson’s case or materially limited the defense. The court distinguished Purnell v. State, reasoning that Wilson identified no viable defense strategy foreclosed by divided loyalty and showed no probability that the former client’s live testimony would have changed the verdict. Because no actual conflict existed, the trial court was not required to conduct a conflict-waiver colloquy with Wilson.
The court also rejected Wilson’s remaining ineffective-assistance claims. The communications between Ray and Robert Teat, the photograph of Teat holding cash, and Cannon’s statements to his sister were admissible; although the nephew’s text messages were inadmissible, the court had already found their admission harmless. Wilson’s Brady claim concerning alleged cooperation agreements was procedurally barred and independently failed because he produced no evidence that undisclosed agreements existed.
Finally, Ray’s later plea to reckless manslaughter did not qualify as newly discovered evidence because it did not exist when Wilson was convicted, and Ray’s mental state did not determine Wilson’s mental state when Wilson arranged the killing. The Superior Court acted within its discretion by deciding the Rule 61 motion on the existing record and affidavits without an evidentiary hearing. Because none of Wilson’s asserted errors had merit, his cumulative-error argument also failed.
Key Takeaways
- A lawyer’s prior representation of a prosecution witness does not establish an actual conflict without evidence that the matters were substantially related or that divided loyalty materially affected the defense.
- A Brady claim based on alleged witness-cooperation agreements requires record support that such agreements existed; speculation about hoped-for sentencing benefits is insufficient.
- A codefendant’s plea entered after the defendant’s trial is not “newly discovered evidence” when it did not exist at the time of judgment.
Why It Matters
The order clarifies the showing required to convert a potential attorney-client conflict into a successful ineffective-assistance claim. Unlike a conflict that forecloses a viable defense, a prior representation that does not constrain counsel’s strategy or use of relevant information does not require reversal or a defendant-level waiver colloquy.
The decision also reinforces the evidentiary and procedural limits on Delaware Rule 61 relief: unsupported allegations of undisclosed cooperation agreements, later-created evidence, and claims already found harmless will not justify a new trial or require an evidentiary hearing.