Background
Anatoliy Derevyanko managed a grain-processing factory in Balakliya while the city was under Russian occupation. Ukrainian authorities charged him with collaborationist activity, alleging that he coordinated the factory’s operations with the occupation administration. He was held in pretrial detention from March 2023 until his conviction in October 2024. Domestic courts repeatedly cited the punishment he faced and asserted risks that he would flee to Russia, influence witnesses, or reoffend.
Yuliya Tarasova, a sales representative for a Ukrainian pharmaceutical manufacturer, was charged with assisting the aggressor State. Investigators alleged that she participated in a scheme to route medicines to Russia through other countries. Although she had cooperated with investigators, provided access to her phone, and remained available for months after learning of the investigation, she was detained in September 2023 based on asserted risks of flight, interference with witnesses, destruction of evidence, and reoffending. She was released on bail in June 2024.
Both applicants challenged the justification and length of their detention under Article 5 § 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Tarasova also argued under Article 5 § 1 that her detention lacked a reasonable suspicion that she had committed an offence.
The Court’s Holding
The Court found violations of Article 5 § 3 in respect of both applicants because the domestic courts had not supplied relevant and sufficient reasons for keeping them in custody. Derevyanko faced the least serious form of the charged offence under domestic law, making reliance on the possible prison sentence an unpersuasive basis for finding a flight risk. The findings that he might influence witnesses or reoffend were unsupported by persuasive circumstances or reasons. The Court also indicated that some domestic decisions appeared to misconceive its case law by invoking society’s interests and demanding greater “firmness” without conducting the required individual assessment.
As to Tarasova, the alleged risks were framed generally and significant facts were disregarded, particularly her prior cooperation, voluntary disclosure of telephone data, and failure to flee or obstruct the investigation despite knowing that she was under scrutiny. The Court nevertheless found no violation of Article 5 § 1: the authorities’ reliance on the newly introduced criminal provision had a reasonable basis, and their view that the case-file material supported an initial reasonable suspicion was not arbitrary. The wartime detention and bail provisions did not themselves violate Article 5 § 3 because they left domestic courts discretion to grant bail or impose a less restrictive measure.
Key Takeaways
- National-security charges and wartime conditions do not eliminate the requirement for individualized, evidence-based reasons for pretrial detention.
- The seriousness of a possible sentence cannot establish a flight risk by itself, particularly where the charged conduct falls within a less serious domestic classification.
- A reasonable suspicion sufficient for initial detention may exist even when the authorities fail to justify keeping the accused in custody for an extended period.
Why It Matters
The judgment distinguishes between the legality of an initial arrest and the continuing necessity of pretrial detention. Even where investigators possess enough material to support a reasonable suspicion, courts must separately demonstrate why detention remains necessary and why less restrictive measures would not address concrete risks.
The decision also confirms that emergency legislation adopted during armed conflict may give courts special detention powers without automatically violating the Convention, but its application remains subject to meaningful judicial scrutiny and the ordinary safeguards of Article 5.