Background
Pavlo Kolesnyk and Sergiy Smelnytskyy were arrested in Kharkiv in July 2022 after allegedly filming Ukrainian military fortifications and equipment and transmitting the footage through Telegram channels used by Russian intelligence services. Initially suspected of unlawfully disseminating information about Ukrainian military positions, they were released on bail before the authorities reclassified the alleged conduct as treason and obtained orders detaining them without bail.
Ukrainian courts repeatedly extended the applicants’ detention, citing risks that they would abscond, influence witnesses, destroy or conceal evidence, obstruct the proceedings, or commit further national-security offences. The applicants, both former police officers, disputed the reasonable suspicion and asserted that the courts had relied on repetitive reasoning, inadequately considered their family and personal circumstances, and treated alternatives to detention as a formality. Their detention lasted from 29 July 2022 until at least 13 December 2024.
The Court’s Holding
The European Court of Human Rights rejected as manifestly ill-founded the applicants’ Article 5 § 1 complaint concerning reasonable suspicion and the reclassification of the alleged offence. Because the investigation was at an early stage, the change in legal classification was not inherently unusual, and the applicants had not made an arguable showing that the treason allegation lacked a factual basis, fell outside the relevant criminal provision, or was made in bad faith.
The Court found no violation of Article 5 § 3. Ukraine’s wartime detention and bail provisions did not create mandatory detention because, as interpreted by Ukraine’s Constitutional Court, domestic courts retained authority to order release or set bail. The domestic courts had relevant and sufficient reasons for detention grounded in the case-specific risks of absconding, interference with evidence or witnesses, and reoffending. Although later extension decisions were succinct and their reasoning changed little, the earlier decisions had sufficiently established the underlying justification.
The Court also found no demonstrated lack of the “special diligence” required in conducting the proceedings. The applicants identified no delay attributable to the authorities, and the Court assessed only the period through 13 December 2024 because it had not been informed of subsequent developments.
Key Takeaways
- Wartime legislation favoring detention for specified national-security offences does not constitute impermissible mandatory detention where courts retain power to release defendants or grant bail.
- Pre-trial detention may remain justified by case-specific risks even when extension orders are concise and repeat earlier reasoning, provided the underlying facts sufficiently support those risks.
- A lengthy detention period does not by itself establish an Article 5 § 3 violation when the reasons remain relevant and sufficient and no authority-caused delay or lack of special diligence is shown.
Why It Matters
The judgment explains how Article 5 § 3 applies to national-security prosecutions conducted under martial law. The wartime context may inform the practical assessment of flight, obstruction, and reoffending risks, but it does not eliminate the requirement of individualized judicial review.
It also distinguishes legislation that makes bail discretionary for certain offences from a categorical system of mandatory detention. The decisive question remains whether courts retain meaningful authority to release the accused and whether detention is supported by relevant, sufficient, and case-specific reasons.