Background
The Estonian Green Party submitted a nine-candidate list for Estonia’s June 2024 European Parliament elections. Estonian law required a deposit equal to five times the monthly minimum wage for each candidate, refundable only if an independent candidate or party list received at least 5% of the votes cast. Because the party paid deposits for only two candidates, the Electoral Commission initially registered those two and refused to register the remaining seven.
The party challenged that refusal before Estonia’s Supreme Court, which provisionally ordered the seven other candidates registered and began reviewing the deposit requirement’s constitutionality. The required deposit was €4,100 per candidate, or €36,900 for a complete nine-candidate list—approximately 2.2 times Estonia’s average gross monthly wage and 2.6 times its median gross monthly wage per candidate. After the party failed to reach the 5% threshold and could not recover the deposits it had paid, the Supreme Court sought a preliminary ruling on whether the requirement complied with the EU Charter.
The Court’s Holding
The Court held that Article 39(2) of the Charter, read with the principle of representative democracy expressed in Article 10 TEU, precludes Estonia’s deposit scheme. Although Member States generally determine eligibility rules for European Parliament elections, they must preserve the practical exercise of the right to stand as a candidate and comply with the proportionality requirements of Article 52(1) of the Charter.
Discouraging non-serious or frivolous candidacies and reducing votes that do not contribute to electing a member may be legitimate objectives. A deposit can, in principle, further those objectives. But the amount required and the 5% refund threshold went beyond what was necessary: they imposed a substantial financial burden, particularly on low-income candidates, smaller parties, new political movements, and marginalised groups, and risked undermining political pluralism. The Court separately held that the deposit condition did not fall within Article 17(1)’s protection of property because it was a condition voluntarily incurred by those choosing to stand for election, not a deprivation or regulation of property.
Key Takeaways
- National rules governing candidacy in European Parliament elections must comply with the Charter’s protection of universal suffrage and the EU principle of representative democracy.
- Electoral deposits may legitimately deter frivolous candidacies, but their amount and refund conditions must not impose a disproportionate barrier to standing for election.
- A deposit of five monthly minimum wages per candidate, refundable only when a candidate or party list reaches 5% of the vote, exceeded what was necessary to achieve Estonia’s stated objectives.
Why It Matters
The judgment places meaningful EU-law limits on Member States’ discretion to impose financial conditions on European Parliament candidacies. Even facially neutral eligibility rules may violate the Charter when their practical effect makes participation unusually difficult for candidates or parties with limited resources.
The ruling also connects proportionality review directly to political pluralism: measures intended to produce a more representative Parliament cannot exclude emerging parties, marginalised groups, or low-income candidates through excessive financial barriers.