The Fourth Department affirms Family Court’s dismissal of a father’s petition to modify custody at the close of his proof for failure to establish a change in circumstances warranting modification.
The Fourth Department dismisses the mother’s appeal from a custody modification order as moot, finding that a subsequent order superseded the order on appeal, while rejecting the exception to the mootness doctrine.
In a significant opinion interpreting Family Court Act article 8, the Fourth Department holds that an attorney for the child has authority to file a family offense petition on behalf of a child against a nonparent, broadening access to protective relief for children.
The Fourth Department affirms Family Court’s summary dismissal of a mother’s petition to modify custody from supervised to unsupervised visitation, finding she failed to make a sufficient evidentiary showing of changed circumstances.
The Fourth Department affirms Family Court’s determination that the respondent father neglected his children and upholds the continuation of foster care placement.
The Fourth Department affirms Family Court’s modification of custody awarding primary physical custody and final decision-making authority to the father based on changed circumstances and the best interests of the children.
The Texas Supreme Court dismissed a parental-termination case for lack of jurisdiction after the trial court failed to enter a written extension order before the Family Code’s automatic-dismissal deadline.
In a companion case to In re H.S., the Texas Supreme Court reversed a father’s parental-termination order for insufficient evidence while affirming the mother’s termination as to one child, demonstrating rigorous case-by-case evidentiary review.
The Texas Supreme Court reversed a mother’s parental-termination order in a 5-3 decision, holding the evidence was legally insufficient and strengthening evidentiary standards for the ‘death penalty of civil cases.’
The Texas Supreme Court granted mandamus relief directing a trial court to withdraw its order removing a parent’s chosen attorney from a parental-termination case, holding the court’s appointment authority does not extend to excluding qualified counsel.