Background
Zia Chishti, CEO of technology company Afiniti, and Tatiana Spottiswoode, a former employee, had an on-and-off consensual romantic relationship between 2014 and 2017. Spottiswoode’s employment contract contained a mandatory arbitration clause. In October 2017, Spottiswoode accused Chishti of harassment and assault through counsel. Afiniti initiated arbitration proceedings, and in April 2019, the arbitrator ruled in Spottiswoode’s favor. Over two years later, in November 2021, Spottiswoode testified before the House Judiciary Committee regarding pending legislation to end forced arbitration of sexual assault claims. Following her testimony, Spottiswoode and her attorney Nancy Smith made statements to the media and on social media criticizing Afiniti’s arbitration policies and Chishti’s conduct.
In November 2022, Chishti and his wife filed a lawsuit alleging defamation, false light invasion of privacy, breach of contract, tortious interference, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy based on Spottiswoode’s congressional testimony and subsequent public statements. Chishti argued that these statements were part of a “smear campaign” designed to damage his reputation and force his resignation from his executive positions. The district court dismissed the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), finding the statements protected by legislative privilege and the First Amendment. Chishti appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal on multiple independent grounds. First, the court held that Spottiswoode’s written and oral testimony before the House Judiciary Committee was absolutely privileged under the common law privilege for communications to the legislature recognized in District of Columbia law. This privilege applies to statements made with an “intention to inform the legislative body” on matters within its jurisdiction, regardless of the witness’s underlying motive or bad faith. Because Spottiswoode was subpoenaed and testified about pending legislation directly addressing her experience with forced arbitration, the privilege applied even though Spottiswoode may have had multiple motivations for testifying.
Second, the court found that Spottiswoode’s and Smith’s post-hearing statements to The Telegraph newspaper and on Twitter were protected as non-actionable opinion under the First Amendment. Statements such as criticism of a “misogynist culture at Afiniti” and characterization of an arbitration action as “retaliatory” were based on true facts and were either statements of opinion or incapable of being proved true or false. The court applied the fair reporting privilege to protect Smith’s republication of Spottiswoode’s congressional testimony, finding that fair reporting protection extends to statements that editorializes or contextualizes official proceedings.
Third, the court rejected Chishti’s breach of contract claims based on alleged violations of protective orders issued in the arbitration. The court found that many alleged breaches were not actual breaches of the protective orders’ terms, and those that involved disclosure of arbitration materials were protected by the legislative privilege. Finally, the court held that Chishti’s other tort claims—tortious interference, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and conspiracy—were duplicative of or dependent upon the defamation claim, and his wife’s loss of consortium claim failed in the absence of an underlying actionable tort.
Key Takeaways
- Legislative testimony is absolutely privileged under District of Columbia common law even when the witness has multiple or improper motives, provided the statement relates to pending legislation within the legislature’s jurisdiction
- Statements of opinion about matters of public concern are not actionable in defamation, particularly when based on true underlying facts that are available to readers
- The fair reporting privilege protects republication of official proceedings and legislative testimony, including posts that editorialize or invite public attention to the proceedings
- Duplicative tort claims that depend on establishing a defamation claim will be dismissed when the underlying defamation claim fails
- Loss of consortium claims require an underlying actionable tort and cannot proceed independently
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces strong First Amendment and common law protections for legislative testimony and related public speech about legislative proceedings. The ruling makes clear that individuals who testify before Congress regarding matters of public concern—such as workplace sexual assault or arbitration policies—have broad immunity from defamation liability for that testimony, even if their motives include personal grievance or reputational concerns about others. This protection extends to attorneys and supporters who republish and comment on the testimony in media and social media contexts.
The decision has practical significance for legislative witnesses, their counsel, and media covering legislative proceedings involving disputed factual claims. It establishes that once testimony is delivered to Congress and becomes part of the legislative record, subsequent public statements characterizing or discussing that testimony receive substantial First Amendment protection as opinion or fair reporting, limiting an adversary’s ability to pursue defamation claims based on the public discussion of legislative proceedings.