Background
Kenneth Deal was appointed to the City of Monroe’s Board of Adjustment in December 2020. The Board of Adjustment is a quasi-judicial body responsible for special use permits, variances, and appeals from municipal administrative bodies. Deal was reappointed to a second term in December 2023. Under Monroe’s city code, all board members “serve at the pleasure of City Council and may be removed at any time with or without cause at the discretion of City Council.” In August 2024, Monroe’s City Council voted to remove Deal without notice to him and without affording him an opportunity to be heard. Deal received only $50-$75 per meeting for his service and was not present at the meeting where his removal was voted upon.
Deal sued the City under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of his procedural due process rights. He sought a declaratory judgment voiding his removal and damages. The district court granted summary judgment for the City, holding that Deal lacked a constitutionally protected property interest in his board seat and therefore could not state a due process claim. Deal appealed to the Fourth Circuit.
The Court’s Holding
The Fourth Circuit affirmed. To invoke procedural due process protections, a person must first demonstrate a constitutionally protected property interest. Property interests are not created by the Constitution but rather by existing rules or understandings stemming from independent sources such as state law. A person claiming a property interest must show a “legitimate claim of entitlement” to the benefit, not merely a unilateral expectation or abstract desire for it.
The court held that when a local government retains discretion over whether to provide or withhold a benefit, no legitimate claim of entitlement can exist. Applying this principle, the Fourth Circuit found that the City of Monroe possessed broad discretion over the Board of Adjustment: it could choose by ordinance whether to create the board at all, could abolish it, could determine the selection and appointment process, and could fix compensation. Critically, the city code explicitly preserved the City Council’s power to remove board members “at any time with or without cause.” Because the City maintained such extensive discretion, Deal could claim at most a unilateral expectation of continued service, not a constitutionally protected property interest.
The court rejected Deal’s reliance on two North Carolina cases. In Board of Adjustment of Town of Swansboro, the state court had held that a board member’s three-year term could not be reduced while the board existed, but that case did not create a federal constitutional property interest and explicitly recognized the town’s authority to abolish the board entirely. In Frank v. Savage, the court had protected board appointees, but only because the board’s existence was mandated by state law with explicit restrictions on the county’s power to change the board’s composition—unlike Monroe’s discretionary board of adjustment. Because the court found no property interest, it did not reach the question of whether the procedures employed were constitutionally adequate.
Key Takeaways
- Municipal board members serving “at pleasure” of the appointing authority have no constitutionally protected property interest in their positions when the municipality retains discretion to create, abolish, or restructure the board.
- The existence of a statutory term length (e.g., three years) does not by itself create a federal property interest if state law and local ordinance authorize removal at any time without cause.
- Property interests are determined by state and local law, and mere expectation of continued service is insufficient to invoke procedural due process; there must be a “legitimate claim of entitlement” with limited municipal discretion.
- Boards mandated by state law with explicit restrictions on removal or composition changes present a different analysis than optional boards, but this case involved an optional board.
Why It Matters
This decision establishes clear authority in the Fourth Circuit that municipal appointees to discretionary boards cannot invoke procedural due process simply because they were removed without notice or a hearing. The ruling prioritizes local autonomy in municipal governance over procedural protections for board members. For attorneys representing clients removed from municipal boards, the key question becomes whether the board’s existence is statutorily mandated and whether state law restricts the municipality’s removal power—not whether removal procedures were constitutionally adequate.
The opinion also clarifies that state law determines the scope of property interests; federal constitutional protections attach only where state or local law genuinely limits the government’s discretion. Practitioners should focus on whether enabling statutes or ordinances restrict rather than preserve the city’s removal power, and whether the board is mandatory versus discretionary, as these factors determine whether a removed appointee has any constitutional claim.
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