Mary Jane Sweet Spot — Seventh Circuit revives license-denial suit, finding Rooker-Feldman inapplicable

Case
Mary Jane Sweet Spot, LLC and Ashley McCoy v. City of Blue Island, et al.
Court
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Judge
Rovner; Pryor; Kolar
Date Decided
October 26, 2026
Docket No.
24-3308
Topics
Rooker-Feldman, Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, Business Licensing, Claim Preclusion
Source
Read the full opinion

Background

Mary Jane Sweet Spot, LLC and its principal, Ashley McCoy, applied for a license to operate a small bakery in Blue Island, Illinois. The city denied the application after learning that the plaintiffs had held an event at the unlicensed premises featuring comedians and “infused” treats and had advertised another event involving alcohol, infused treats, and hookah smoking. A municipal hearing officer recommended sustaining the denial.

The plaintiffs bypassed further administrative review before the Blue Island City Council and sought judicial review in Illinois state court. The state trial court dismissed their petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and for untimeliness, and the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed based on the failure to exhaust. While the state appeal was pending, the plaintiffs sued the city and other defendants in federal court, asserting constitutional and state-law claims arising from the license denial. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and denied reconsideration.

The Court’s Holding

The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that Rooker-Feldman did not deprive the district court of jurisdiction. The plaintiffs alleged injuries caused by the municipal hearing officer’s decision sustaining the license denial, not injuries caused by the state-court judgment. The state courts merely failed to remedy the asserted preexisting injury.

The court explained that a federal claim is not barred merely because it follows related state-court litigation or overlaps with issues presented there. Because the federal claims could exist independently of the state-court judgment, they did not seek review and rejection of an injury-producing state judgment within Rooker-Feldman’s narrow scope.

The court recognized that claim preclusion might present a separate obstacle, particularly because the plaintiffs had pursued state-court review before filing their federal claims. But the defendants had not raised or briefed that defense, so the court declined to decide it and left the issue for the district court on remand if the defendants choose to pursue it.

Key Takeaways

  • Rooker-Feldman does not apply when the alleged injury was caused by a municipal administrative decision and the state court merely failed to correct it.
  • Overlap between federal claims and prior state proceedings does not itself eliminate federal subject-matter jurisdiction.
  • Claim preclusion, rather than Rooker-Feldman, may be the relevant defense after state-court review of an administrative action, but the defense must be properly raised and adjudicated.

Why It Matters

The decision reinforces the narrow scope of Rooker-Feldman and the distinction between jurisdiction and preclusion. Federal courts retain jurisdiction over claims alleging injuries caused by state or municipal officials even when a state court previously declined to remedy those injuries.

For litigants challenging Illinois administrative decisions, however, choosing to pursue state-court review may still create claim-preclusion risks in later federal litigation. The Seventh Circuit expressed no view on whether preclusion ultimately bars these plaintiffs’ claims.

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