Background
The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) caps the amount a political party’s national or congressional committee may spend on campaign activities when those expenditures are made in coordination with a candidate — for example, producing a television advertisement after consulting with the candidate’s campaign on content or timing. 52 U.S.C. §30116(d). The limits vary by office and state: in 2026, a national party committee could spend as little as $130,600 and as much as $4,071,800 in coordination with a Senate candidate. Political parties have long been free to make independent expenditures without limit; it is only spending produced or placed in consultation with a candidate that FECA restricts.
In 2001, the Supreme Court upheld those coordinated-expenditure limits in Federal Election Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431 (Colorado II), reasoning principally that the limits prevented donors from circumventing contribution caps by routing large sums through party committees and that Congress warranted deference on that anti-circumvention judgment. In 2022, the National Republican Senatorial Committee, the National Republican Congressional Committee, then-Senate candidate JD Vance, and then-Representative Steve Chabot filed suit in the Southern District of Ohio arguing that subsequent First Amendment decisions — particularly McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (2014), and FEC v. Ted Cruz for Senate, 596 U.S. 289 (2022) — had so eroded Colorado II‘s doctrinal foundations that the limits could no longer stand.
The en banc Sixth Circuit upheld the limits under Colorado II, although a majority of the judges wrote separately to question the precedent’s continuing vitality. 117 F.4th 389 (6th Cir. 2024). The Supreme Court granted certiorari. Notably, the federal government declined to defend the statute, agreeing with petitioners that the limits are unconstitutional; the Democratic party committees intervened to defend them, and the Court appointed Roman Martinez as amicus curiae to argue in support of the Sixth Circuit’s judgment.
The Court’s Holding
Justice Kavanaugh, writing for a six-Justice majority (Roberts, C.J., and Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett, JJ.), held that FECA’s political-party coordinated-expenditure limits violate the First Amendment and overruled Colorado II. The Court first dispatched the mootness challenge, noting that Vice President Vance maintains an active Statement of Candidacy with the FEC for a 2028 Senate race and an extant campaign committee, and that private enforcement suits remain available under FECA even if the FEC itself declines to act.
On the merits, the Court applied the “closely drawn” scrutiny standard governing contribution-side restrictions, which requires any regulation to be proportionate, necessary, and narrowly tailored to a constitutionally permissible interest. The Court held that only one interest survives: preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance. Earlier potential justifications — reducing campaign spending generally, curbing a party’s influence over its own candidates, and preventing “undue influence” by donors — were rejected as categorically impermissible under McCutcheon and Cruz. The sole surviving rationale, anti-circumvention, could not sustain the limits because less-speech-restrictive tools — FECA’s existing earmarking rules (which treat party contributions directed to a specific candidate as direct candidate contributions) and its robust disclosure requirements — together adequately address the circumvention risk without suppressing core political party speech.
The majority concluded that Colorado II had applied impermissibly deferential scrutiny and that its donor-influence rationale had been squarely rejected by subsequent precedent. To the extent Colorado II retained any vitality, the Court expressly overruled it. The Sixth Circuit’s judgment was reversed and the case remanded. Justice Kagan dissented, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson.
Key Takeaways
- Colorado II is overruled: political parties may now make coordinated expenditures with their candidates without any statutory dollar cap, placing party-candidate coordination on par with the unlimited independent expenditures parties were already permitted.
- The only constitutionally valid interest in campaign finance regulation remains preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance; preventing “undue influence,” ingratiation, or access — rationales that animated much of prior doctrine — are not permissible bases for restricting speech.
- FECA’s earmarking rules (treating donor-directed party contributions as direct candidate contributions) and disclosure requirements are, in combination with base contribution limits, sufficient and less restrictive alternatives that satisfy the anti-circumvention interest without suppressing party speech.
- Closely drawn scrutiny demands rigorous, not deferential, judicial review; congressional judgments about campaign finance are not entitled to special deference when core political speech is at stake.
- Standing and mootness can be anchored to an official’s filed Statement of Candidacy and active campaign committee even where future electoral plans are uncertain.
Why It Matters
This decision fundamentally reshapes the legal landscape for political party spending. By eliminating FECA’s coordinated-expenditure caps, the ruling allows national and congressional party committees to devote unlimited funds to advertisements, ground operations, and other campaign activities produced in direct consultation with their candidates — something that has been restricted since 1974. Parties can now serve as far more powerful financial and strategic partners to their nominees without bumping against federal spending ceilings, potentially reversing the competitive disadvantage parties have faced relative to outside Super PACs and 501(c)(4) groups since Citizens United and SpeechNow.
Beyond its immediate effect on party spending, the decision signals that the Court’s six-Justice majority is prepared to apply McCutcheon and Cruz aggressively to unwind other campaign finance restrictions that rest on rationales beyond direct quid pro quo corruption. Practitioners advising parties, candidates, and donors should anticipate that the coordination rules undergirding much of modern campaign finance compliance will face fresh constitutional challenges in the wake of this ruling.