Background
Edward Williams entered Pennsylvania’s Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition program after a 2000 DUI charge. In 2005, he was convicted of a second DUI for driving with a blood-alcohol concentration of at least 0.16%. Because of the earlier offense, the second DUI was punishable by up to five years in prison, although Williams received a sentence of ninety days to two years in home confinement.
The potential five-year punishment brought Williams within 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits firearm possession by a person convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment. After learning in 2015 that the conviction disqualified him, Williams disposed of his firearms and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court granted him summary judgment, holding § 922(g)(1) unconstitutional as applied to him, and the government appealed. The Third Circuit reheard the case en banc.
The Court’s Holding
The en banc Third Circuit affirmed. Williams remained among “the people” protected by the Second Amendment, and his proposed possession of a handgun or long gun for defense of himself and his family in the home fell within the Amendment’s text. The government therefore bore the burden of showing that permanently disarming him was consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.
The court held that history supports disarming people who presently pose a physical danger through the potential misuse of firearms, not everyone labeled a felon or convicted of an offense punishable by more than one year. Courts assessing an as-applied challenge should identify the conduct established by the predicate offense’s elements, as clarified by permissible Shepard documents, rather than conduct an open-ended inquiry into the person’s general dangerousness. Williams’s repeat-DUI offense contained no threatening or violent element, and the record showed no injury or property damage. The government’s proposed analogies—particularly historical laws governing public intoxication and habitual drunkards—did not establish a tradition of permanently disarming someone for comparable conduct to prevent armed violence.
Key Takeaways
- Section 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional as applied to Williams; the court did not invalidate the statute in every application.
- A felony label or a maximum sentence exceeding one year does not by itself establish a historical basis for permanent disarmament.
- The relevant historical principle permits disarming people who pose a present physical danger involving the potential misuse of arms, and the government must prove that its proposed analogues are comparable in both purpose and operation.
Why It Matters
The decision supplies a more offense-focused framework for Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) in the Third Circuit. It directs courts to examine the predicate offense’s elements and limited conviction records, while rejecting an unrestricted investigation into a challenger’s life and general character.
The ruling also confirms that people convicted of nonviolent offenses may bring successful as-applied challenges when the government cannot connect their continued disarmament to a historically grounded tradition aimed at preventing armed violence. At the same time, the decision leaves § 922(g)(1) available in cases involving offenses or records that establish the requisite threat of physical harm.