Background
Stanley Conway appealed a nonfinal Miami-Dade Circuit Court order governing temporary timesharing with the parties’ three children. The order allowed Conway timesharing only insofar as the eldest child was willing to participate, and required all three children to attend together.
Conway challenged several aspects of the temporary order. The Third District wrote only to address the condition allowing the eldest child’s willingness to control the timesharing arrangement.
The Court’s Holding
The court reversed and remanded. Florida law requires courts to decide parenting and timesharing matters according to each minor child’s best interests; a court may not delegate that decision to another person, including a child.
By making Conway’s court-ordered time with all three children contingent on the eldest child’s willingness to participate, the trial court made that child the decisionmaker over whether any timesharing occurred. Because the children were required to attend together, the eldest child’s refusal also prevented timesharing with the younger children. That arrangement abdicated the court’s nondelegable duty to determine each child’s timesharing based on that child’s individual best interests.
Key Takeaways
- A court cannot give a child veto power over court-ordered timesharing.
- Timesharing decisions must be made by the court under the best-interests standard.
- Each child’s interests must be assessed individually; one child’s preference cannot control siblings’ contact.
Why It Matters
The decision reinforces that a child’s wishes may not replace a court’s responsibility to set a legally enforceable timesharing plan. Temporary parenting orders, like final ones, must leave the ultimate timesharing determination with the court.
On remand, the trial court must enter a timesharing schedule based on its determination of each child’s best interests.