Background
Brandon Lee Fisher pleaded guilty to driving while barred, an aggravated misdemeanor, under a written plea agreement made pursuant to Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.10(3). The agreement called for a 160-day jail term, with all but ten days suspended, two years of probation, a fine, and payment of attorney fees, court costs, and Category B restitution. The agreement made the court’s acceptance of those terms a condition of the plea.
The district court accepted the plea and imposed the agreed sentence. Although the original sentencing order found Fisher able to pay only $100 of Category B restitution, Fisher successfully sought a corrected order requiring him to pay all such restitution in accordance with the plea agreement. He appealed, arguing that he could not waive a statutory right to a reasonable-ability-to-pay determination or, alternatively, that any waiver was not knowing and voluntary.
The Court’s Holding
The Iowa Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. A defendant who pleads guilty generally may appeal only by establishing good cause, and Fisher did not do so. His sentence challenge concerned terms the court was bound to impose after accepting the parties’ Rule 2.10(3) agreement, including the Category B restitution provision Fisher had asked the court to add to the corrected sentencing order.
The court held that Fisher could not establish good cause by challenging the imposition of the binding bargain he negotiated and repeatedly asked the court to enforce. His alternative challenge to the validity of his guilty plea also could not provide relief on direct appeal because he waived a motion in arrest of judgment and was immediately sentenced after being advised that doing so would forfeit a plea challenge.
Key Takeaways
- A defendant must show good cause to appeal after pleading guilty to a non-class-A offense.
- A challenge to a sentence mandated by an accepted Rule 2.10(3) plea agreement does not establish good cause in these circumstances.
- A defendant who waives a motion in arrest of judgment and is immediately sentenced cannot obtain direct appellate relief challenging the guilty plea.
Why It Matters
The decision reinforces that a defendant cannot use a direct appeal to contest a sentencing term that was part of a binding plea agreement accepted by the court—particularly when the defendant sought correction of the judgment to include that term. It also underscores the procedural consequence of waiving a motion in arrest of judgment before immediate sentencing: later challenges to the plea itself ordinarily will not support appellate jurisdiction.