Background
Rebekah Jones worked for the Florida Department of Health and was assigned to create and manage its public COVID-19 Dashboard. She alleged that then-Deputy Secretary Shamarial Roberson directed her to reconfigure reopening data in a way Jones regarded as falsification. Jones refused, continued publishing some data without departmental approval, and was removed from the Dashboard assignment.
After her reassignment, Jones altered Dashboard files and removed colleagues’ administrative access, which she did not restore when directed. She later texted her supervisor that she was considering a whistleblower complaint and emailed an outside group criticizing the expected accessibility and transparency of the replacement Dashboard team. DOH terminated her on May 18, 2020. Her first written complaint concerning the alleged misconduct was a charge filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations two months later.
Jones sued DOH under Florida’s public-sector Whistle-blower’s Act and asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against DOH, Secretary Joseph A. Ladapo in his official capacity, and Roberson individually for alleged First Amendment retaliation. The circuit court entered summary judgment for all defendants, and Jones appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The First District affirmed. On the statutory claim, it held that Jones failed to establish a prima facie retaliation case because she made no protected disclosure before her termination. She had not reported covered misconduct to a recipient identified by section 112.3187 or submitted the written and signed complaint required by the statute. Her text about filing a complaint concerning her treatment, the Dashboard, and alleged mismanagement was not a protected disclosure of a legal violation.
The court also rejected Jones’ proposed “preemptive retaliation” theory. Unlike statutes expressly covering threatened or anticipated disclosures, Florida’s public-sector act protects an employee from adverse action “for disclosing” specified information. Because the act is a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, the court declined to expand it beyond its express terms. Jones’ alleged refusal to falsify data also was not a refusal to participate in an “adverse action” under the statute, which refers to prohibited personnel action against a protected person.
Jones’ First Amendment claims likewise failed because her Dashboard-related communications were made pursuant to her public-employment responsibilities, not as a private citizen. She identified herself publicly as the Dashboard manager and spoke with authority derived from her position. She therefore could not show that DOH terminated her in retaliation for constitutionally protected citizen speech.
Key Takeaways
- A Florida public employee must make a disclosure satisfying the recipient, subject-matter, and procedural requirements of section 112.3187 before an adverse employment action to establish a statutory whistleblower-retaliation claim.
- Florida’s public-sector Whistle-blower’s Act does not create a cause of action for retaliation based only on an anticipated or threatened future disclosure.
- Speech owing its existence to a public employee’s assigned duties—including public statements made with authority derived from the employee’s position—is employee speech rather than protected private-citizen speech.
Why It Matters
The decision strictly applies the prerequisites of Florida’s public-sector whistleblower law. An employee’s objection to alleged misconduct, intent to complain, or refusal to follow a directive does not substitute for a qualifying disclosure made through the channels and in the form specified by the statute.
The ruling also underscores that public employees asserting First Amendment retaliation must distinguish speech made as citizens from communications arising from their official responsibilities. Even speech addressing a matter of substantial public interest is not protected under this framework if made in the employee’s governmental role.