- Court
- Florida Third District Court of Appeal
- Case Number
- 3D2026-0859
- Date Filed
- May 27, 2026
- Judge
- Scales, C.J.
- Disposition
- Petition dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
Background
Tajhon Wilson was convicted in 2008 of armed robbery with a firearm and sentenced to life in prison. His direct appeal was affirmed in Wilson v. State, 18 So. 3d 1262 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009). Since then, Wilson has filed sixteen unsuccessful petitions and appeals in the Third DCA, frequently alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. In 2018, the trial court entered a sanction order under State v. Spencer, 751 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1999), prohibiting Wilson from further pro se filings.
Wilson now filed a petition labeled as seeking a “belated appeal,” asserting he discovered new evidence that may exonerate him and that his attorney withdrew from representing him. Because the trial court’s filing bar prevents him from filing a successive postconviction motion, Wilson asked the appellate court to either lift the sanction order or hear his postconviction motion in the first instance.
Holding
The Third DCA dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(c) provides a mechanism for belated appeals of lower court orders, but Wilson was not seeking a belated appeal of an existing order — he was asking the appellate court to act in the first instance because he cannot file in the trial court.
The court characterized this as “a cautionary tale for pro se litigants about the effect of sanction orders entered pursuant to State v. Spencer.” From a practical perspective, the court explained, a Spencer filing bar “marks the pro se litigant’s end of the road, not only in the trial court, but also in the appellate court.” The reasoning is structural: appellate courts are reviewing courts; without a lower court order, there is nothing to review and no appellate jurisdiction. The court cited Jones v. State, 372 So. 3d 1291 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023) and State v. Maldonado, 156 So. 3d 589 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015).
The court also noted that the Legislature amended Florida’s Vexatious Litigant Law (section 68.093) in 2025, separate from a court’s inherent Spencer authority.
Key Takeaways
- A Spencer filing bar in the trial court effectively bars access to the appellate court as well, because without a lower court order there is nothing for the appellate court to review.
- Rule 9.141(c)’s belated appeal mechanism applies only to appeals of existing lower court orders — it cannot be used to obtain original relief.
- Appellate courts cannot hear postconviction claims in the first instance; they are structurally limited to reviewing lower court determinations.
- The 2025 amendments to Florida’s Vexatious Litigant Law (§ 68.093) are separate from the court’s inherent Spencer authority to bar filings.
Why It Matters
This opinion serves as a frank judicial acknowledgment that Spencer filing bars are, for practical purposes, permanent. While the decision is a warning to pro se litigants about the consequences of repetitive frivolous filings, it also raises serious access-to-justice questions: a litigant with a legitimate newly-discovered-evidence claim has no path to present it if a filing bar exists. The court’s straightforward statement that the filing bar is the “end of the road” — even for potentially meritorious claims — underscores the severity of Spencer sanctions and the importance of presenting legitimate claims through proper channels before such sanctions are imposed.