Background
In 2017, Nicholas Anderson and Meagan Smith crossed paths at a press conference preceding a public hearing on a proposed hog farming operation. Anderson supported the measure; Smith opposed it. During an on-camera interview, Smith stood behind a speaker holding a protest sign. Anderson approached her, and the encounter turned contentious. Smith told the responding officer that Anderson had bumped his chest into her to block her sign; Anderson was arrested for assault and later charged with battery. After a bench trial, Anderson was found not guilty in May 2019.
Just before the criminal trial, Anderson filed a civil defamation suit against Smith in May 2018, claiming she had falsely and publicly accused him of assault when he was merely attempting to hand her a business card. The complaint was later amended to add malicious prosecution. Smith filed a countercomplaint for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and in March 2023 she moved to dismiss Anderson’s claims under Illinois’s Citizen Participation Act (CPA), 735 ILCS 110/1 et seq., which provides immunity and dismissal for lawsuits targeting protected participation in government — commonly known as Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs).
The trial court denied Smith’s motion, applying the First District Appellate Court’s “meritless and retaliatory” standard from Ryan v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. and finding no basis for dismissal. The Fourth District Appellate Court reversed, repudiating the Ryan test in favor of what it called a “true goal” inquiry focused on the plaintiff’s subjective intent, and remanded for further proceedings. The Illinois Supreme Court granted Anderson’s petition for leave to appeal.
The Court’s Holding
The Illinois Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the appellate court’s judgment as modified. The court held that, for cases filed before January 1, 2026, the second prong of the post-Sandholm anti-SLAPP test — requiring the movant to show that the plaintiff’s claims are solely based on, related to, or in response to the movant’s protected participation in government — calls for a subjective inquiry into the plaintiff’s intent in bringing suit, not a rigid showing that the lawsuit is both legally meritless and retaliatory. The court concluded that Ryan and its First District progeny had misread Sandholm v. Kuecker, where “meritless” and “retaliatory” were used as descriptive adjectives for SLAPPs generally, not as independently required elements the movant must prove.
Under the correct standard, the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating from the pleadings and supporting documents that the plaintiff’s true goal in filing suit was to chill or punish the defendant’s participation in government, rather than to genuinely seek damages for personal harm. Factors such as claim weakness or suspicious timing may bear on that intent inquiry but are not prerequisites. If a material factual dispute about the plaintiff’s intent remains after reviewing the record, the defendant has failed to carry that burden and the motion must be denied with prejudice.
The court also disagreed with the appellate court on one point: where a factual dispute remains on any prong of the test, the trial court may not hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve it. The court reasoned that evidentiary hearings are inconsistent with the CPA’s 90-day ruling deadline, its suspension of discovery, and the consistent de novo standard of review applied in Sandholm, Glorioso, and Walsh. The trial court must resolve the motion solely on the pleadings and any supporting documents — such as depositions taken before discovery was suspended.
Key Takeaways
- Illinois’s anti-SLAPP second prong turns on the plaintiff’s subjective intent — whether the suit’s true goal is to chill protected government participation — not on whether the claims are meritless and retaliatory as required by Ryan and First District precedent.
- A legally viable claim can still be dismissed as a SLAPP if the defendant meets the difficult burden of showing the plaintiff’s sole purpose was to deter or punish protected activity; conversely, a weak claim does not automatically qualify for dismissal without proof of that intent.
- Trial courts may not hold evidentiary hearings to resolve factual disputes on anti-SLAPP motions; the ruling must be based only on pleadings and supporting documents already in the record before discovery is stayed.
- The 2025 amendments to the CPA — which expand protections to the press and remove the “solely” limitation — apply only to actions filed on or after January 1, 2026, and did not govern this case.
Why It Matters
This decision resolves a long-standing split between Illinois appellate districts and resets the framework for anti-SLAPP litigation in cases governed by the pre-2026 CPA. By discarding the Ryan “meritless and retaliatory” test — which functioned as a nearly insuperable burden requiring defendants to essentially win on the merits before obtaining SLAPP dismissal — the court lowers the bar for movants while keeping the inquiry focused on purpose rather than legal strength. Attorneys defending activists, community organizers, crime reporters, and others who speak out at public proceedings now have a clearer, more workable path to early dismissal without needing to disprove every element of the opposing claim.
At the same time, the court’s rejection of evidentiary hearings preserves the CPA’s core efficiencies — expedited proceedings, a discovery stay, and swift resolution — that make anti-SLAPP protection meaningful in practice. Combined with the 2025 legislative expansion now in effect for new cases, Anderson v. Smith marks a significant recalibration of how Illinois courts will police abuse of the judicial process to silence civic participation.