Background
Triton Community College appointed Geri Brewer as nursing department chair in January 2020, providing her five lecture hour equivalents (LHE) of release time per semester as specified in Article III(K) of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The Cook County College Teachers Union grieved this assignment, claiming that past practice entitled Brewer to full release time. The Union argued that from 2007 through fall 2019—a 12½-year period spanning 25 semesters—the nursing department chair had received full release 60% or more of the time.
The CBA’s Article I(K) contained a “past practice” preservation clause requiring four elements: the practice must be (1) reasonably consistent, (2) clearly articulated and known to both parties, (3) acted upon, and (4) established within the 20 years preceding the grievance and occurring 60% of the time. Triton denied the grievance, arguing that Article III(K)’s specific formula controlled and that the Union failed to meet the 60% threshold when measured over the full 20-year lookback period. The dispute proceeded to arbitration.
The Court’s Holding
The arbitrator sustained the Union’s grievance, finding that Brewer was entitled to full release time based on past practice. The arbitrator interpreted the past practice provision to mean that a practice must exist sometime within (not necessarily throughout) the 20-year period preceding the grievance. Applying this interpretation, the arbitrator found that the 12½-year period from 2007 to 2019, during which the nursing chair received full release 60% of the time, satisfied all four elements of the past practice doctrine.
When Triton refused to comply with the arbitration award, the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board (IELRB) found that the college violated sections 14(a)(8) and 14(a)(1) of the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act—prohibitions on refusing to comply with binding arbitration awards and on interfering with employee rights. On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the Board. The court held that the arbitrator did not exceed its authority and that the award drew its essence from the CBA. Under the deferential standard of arbitration review, the arbitrator’s interpretation of the past practice provision was within its scope, and the court would not substitute its own interpretation merely because it might read the contract differently.
Key Takeaways
- An employer violates labor law by refusing to comply with a binding arbitration award absent a clear showing that the arbitrator exceeded authority or imposed views not grounded in the contract.
- When a CBA contains multiple provisions addressing the same subject (here, Article III(K) specifying minimum release time and Article I(K) preserving past practices), an arbitrator properly exercises authority by analyzing both and applying the past practice doctrine.
- Judicial review of arbitration awards is extremely limited; courts will not second-guess an arbitrator’s interpretation of contract language if a reasonable interpretive route exists, even if the court would interpret differently.
- Precise contract wording matters: the phrase “reasonable period of time” and “within 20 years” (versus “for 20 years” or “throughout 20 years”) supported the arbitrator’s interpretation that a past practice need not span the entire lookback period.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the fundamental arbitration principle that parties who contractually agree to binding arbitration accept the arbitrator’s interpretation of their agreement. For employers and unions, the ruling clarifies that even when a contract contains specific, quantified provisions, arbitrators retain authority to consider related provisions (such as past practice clauses) that may expand or modify those terms. The court’s emphasis on the “extremely limited” scope of judicial review of arbitration awards means that parties cannot easily challenge awards by arguing the arbitrator misinterpreted the contract; the challenge must show that no reasonable interpretive route exists.
The case also underscores the importance of precise drafting in CBAs. Triton’s reliance on Article III(K)’s specific language failed, in part, because Article I(K)’s past practice clause used language reasonably interpreted to permit consideration of practices within (rather than throughout) the 20-year lookback window. Employers and unions drafting labor agreements should attend carefully to overlapping or potentially conflicting provisions and the precise language used to define temporal or frequency thresholds.