Background
William Bobbs Sr. wanted to ensure that his second wife, Carolyn Janice “Jan” Bobbs, could remain at a retirement community if she survived him. In 2017, attorney F. Jefferson Crump III jointly represented the couple and proposed a qualified terminable interest property trust, commonly called a QTIP trust. That estate-planning device can provide income to a surviving spouse while directing the remaining property to specified beneficiaries after the spouse’s death. Bobbs Sr. ultimately transferred about $3 million to the trust. The agreement, executed January 10, 2018, made the trust irrevocable, provided income to Jan during her lifetime, and named Bobbs Sr.’s two adult children, Julia Beaman and William Bobbs Jr., as remainder beneficiaries.
The children knew before execution that their father planned to establish the QTIP trust. During a recorded December 2017 lunch, they asked whether it would be revocable, and Bobbs Sr. indicated that he retained control while alive. Bobbs Jr. also voiced concern about Crump’s possible conflict of interest and discussed it with attorney friends. But the children did not ask to inspect the agreement, challenge the trust, or otherwise act within the next two years. After Bobbs Sr. died in May 2020, they obtained and read the document. In February 2022, they sued Crump for legal malpractice, alleging that the irrevocable instrument did not reflect their father’s intent and that Crump had facilitated Jan’s undue influence. The trial court entered summary judgment for Crump under Indiana’s two-year limitations period.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals affirmed. Judge May explained that an Indiana attorney-malpractice claim accrues when the plaintiff knows, or through ordinary diligence could discover, the alleged misconduct and some ascertainable injury. A claimant need not know the full extent of the loss. Facts that would put a person of common knowledge and experience on notice that a right may have been invaded trigger a duty to investigate with reasonable promptness.
The children relied on Indiana precedent holding that an intended beneficiary’s malpractice claim over a negligently drafted will accrued at the testator’s death. The panel distinguished that rule because a will has no dispositive effect until death, while an inter vivos trust—one created during the settlor’s lifetime—becomes operative when executed. The QTIP trust therefore affected ownership and the beneficiaries’ interests in January 2018. Any alleged drafting error, conflict, or undue influence had produced ascertainable consequences by then, even though the children would not receive a distribution until later.
The designated evidence also showed enough notice to require diligence. The children knew about the proposed trust, questioned whether it could be revoked, suspected a conflict, and consulted lawyers informally. Bobbs Jr. acknowledged that their father likely would have supplied a copy if asked. Their failure to obtain and examine the agreement did not postpone accrual until Bobbs Sr.’s death. Because the complaint came more than four years after execution, every malpractice theory tied to creation of the trust was untimely.
Key Takeaways
- For Indiana limitations purposes, an inter vivos trust ordinarily becomes operative when executed, unlike a will, whose dispositive effect begins at death.
- An intended beneficiary need not know the full amount of damage before a legal-malpractice claim accrues; some ascertainable injury and facts prompting reasonable inquiry are enough.
- Questions about revocability, suspected conflicts, and knowledge that a trust has been created can trigger a duty to request and review the instrument promptly.
- Reframing the alleged negligence—from undue influence to drafting contrary to intent—does not restart the limitations period when both theories arise from the same trust execution.
Why It Matters
Beaman draws a practical line for Indiana trust and professional-liability lawyers. Potential beneficiaries cannot necessarily wait for a settlor’s death before investigating alleged defects in a funded lifetime trust. When family members know that an irrevocable instrument has changed present property rights and they have concrete concerns about its terms or the lawyer’s loyalties, the limitations clock may already be running.
Estate-planning counsel should document the nature of the instrument, its irrevocability, joint-representation disclosures, and the client’s expressed objectives. Litigators evaluating a beneficiary claim should build a detailed chronology of execution, funding, notice, access to the document, suspected wrongdoing, and the first ascertainable loss. The key question is not when the eventual remainder became payable, but when reasonable diligence would have revealed that the operative trust allegedly departed from the settlor’s plan.