Background
Indiana’s Court of Appeals has clarified that the criminal-immunity provision in Aaron’s Law protects only a person who satisfies each statutory condition, including personally requesting emergency medical help for someone apparently experiencing an opioid overdose. The published decision also reinforces a separate procedural rule: when a motion to dismiss depends on disputed facts, Indiana law requires supporting affidavits. A defendant who omits them can lose the motion without reaching the immunity question.
Greenwood police responded after Angela Floring called 911 about a woman who was overdosing. When officers arrived, Angela’s brother, Nathan Floring, was performing CPR, and three doses of naloxone had already been administered. A consensual search of the home uncovered methamphetamine and a burnt spoon in Floring’s bedroom. Angela told officers that Floring had not wanted her to call 911. Prosecutors charged him with Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia and alleged that he was a habitual offender.
Floring sought dismissal under Aaron’s Law, Indiana Code section 16-42-27-2. That statute encourages lifesaving responses to opioid overdoses by granting limited immunity from specified low-level drug charges when a person obtains and administers an overdose-intervention drug, summons help, stays at the scene, and cooperates. Floring asserted that he had received naloxone from his treatment provider and participated in summoning emergency services while administering it. He did not, however, submit an affidavit supporting those factual assertions, and his motion was not signed and verified. The Johnson Superior Court denied dismissal, and the Court of Appeals accepted an interlocutory appeal.
The Court’s Holding
Chief Judge Tavitas, writing for a unanimous panel, affirmed on two independent grounds. First, Indiana Code section 35-34-1-8(a) says that a fact-based motion to dismiss must be accompanied by affidavits containing sworn factual allegations. Floring’s claim to immunity depended on facts about how he obtained naloxone, what he did during the emergency, and how assistance was requested. Because he supplied no affidavit or verified motion, the trial court properly rejected his request. The holding gives trial counsel a straightforward warning: legal briefing and unsworn assertions cannot substitute for the evidentiary submission the dismissal statute expressly requires.
Second, the panel held that Floring did not qualify for immunity even apart from that procedural defect. Subsection 2(g)(7) applies when the individual came into contact with police because “the individual requested emergency medical assistance” for another person who appeared to be experiencing an opioid-related overdose. Reading those words according to their ordinary meaning, the court concluded that the person claiming immunity must be the person who requested the assistance. It was undisputed that Angela, not Floring, placed the 911 call. The evidence went further: Angela said Floring did not want her to make that call.
The court rejected Floring’s argument that this reading undermined the statute’s lifesaving purpose or produced an absurd result. The General Assembly chose a conditional form of immunity rather than blanket protection for everyone present during an overdose. Requiring the claimant to take the specified actions—including requesting assistance—was consistent with that legislative choice. Although courts construe ambiguity in penal statutes in a defendant’s favor, the panel found the relevant language plain and would not broaden the statutory class beyond the conditions the legislature wrote.
Key Takeaways
- A defendant seeking dismissal on a fact-dependent immunity theory must attach affidavits complying with Indiana Code section 35-34-1-8(a); an unverified motion containing factual assertions is insufficient.
- Aaron’s Law immunity under section 16-42-27-2(g) is conditional. The person invoking it must satisfy every listed criterion, not merely administer naloxone, perform CPR, remain present, or cooperate with responders.
- Under subsection (g)(7), the immunity claimant must personally request emergency medical assistance. Another person’s 911 call does not satisfy that element for a bystander or participant who later encounters police.
Why It Matters
Floring is a practical roadmap for Indiana lawyers handling overdose-related drug charges. Defense counsel should investigate every statutory element early, preserve dispatch recordings and body-camera evidence, and support a dismissal motion with sworn testimony establishing how naloxone was obtained, who administered it, who summoned help, and how the client cooperated. Prosecutors and trial judges now have published appellate authority for treating the identity of the person who requested aid as a distinct element, rather than inferring eligibility from helpful conduct at the scene.
The decision also exposes a potentially narrow gap in Indiana’s overdose-response protections: several people may act together to save a life, but the present statutory language does not necessarily protect each participant from the listed possession offenses. Unless the General Assembly changes that language, practitioners should not assume that administering naloxone or performing CPR carries the same immunity as personally requesting emergency assistance. The court’s message is exacting but clear—Aaron’s Law rewards the particular conduct its text identifies, and procedural compliance is essential to obtain that protection before trial.