Gerou v. State — Court of Appeals Reverses Felony Intimidation Convictions, Holds DCS Is Not a ‘Government’ Under Terrorism Statute

Case
Mykal J. A. Gerou v. State of Indiana
Court
Court of Appeals of Indiana
Date Decided
2026-06-05
Docket No.
25A-CR-2601
Judge(s)
Felix (authored); May and Mathias concurring
Topics
Criminal Law, Intimidation, Statutory Interpretation, Sentencing
Source
Full opinion on CourtListener · PDF

Background

Mykal Gerou’s interactions with the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) began when DCS received a report of child neglect concerning Gerou and his partner’s newborn in April 2024. DCS removed the child from their care, triggering a CHINS (Child in Need of Services) case. Over the following weeks, Gerou made threatening statements to multiple individuals involved in the case.

During a June 3, 2024, assessment with psychotherapist Stacey Cornett—a DCS service provider—Gerou repeatedly referenced his concealed carry permit, patted his hip suggesting he had a gun, and stated he had “the right to do whatever it takes to use my concealing carry to protect my child, children from kidnappers.” He also warned Cornett she “better not be like the f***ers in Michigan” and threatened “or else” and “you will pay.” Cornett felt so threatened she eventually left Indiana. On June 20, Gerou told DCS caseworker Mary Buxton at a meeting, “Mess with baby bear, you’re going to die.” On June 24, he told DCS supervisor Joyce Bischoff by phone that he had contacted a militia group and told them he had “kidnappers that need to be killed.”

Gerou was convicted of five counts of intimidation: one Level 5 felony count for threatening Cornett (elevated because of a threat to commit terrorism), three Level 5 felony counts for the DCS-directed threats (also elevated as terrorism threats), and one Class A misdemeanor count for an unrelated threat to an animal control officer. The trial court sentenced him to 12 years of incarceration with one year suspended.

The Court’s Holding

The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions. On the three DCS-related counts, the court held the State failed to present sufficient evidence that Gerou’s threats constituted threats to commit “terrorism” as defined in Indiana Code section 35-31.5-2-329. The terrorism definition requires that force or violence be threatened against a “government” or the civilian population. The court conducted a detailed statutory analysis, noting that Indiana’s criminal code separately defines “governmental entity”—which includes state agencies like DCS—but the terrorism statute uses only “government,” a broader term the legislature must have intended to have a different, more general meaning.

Because DCS is a state agency (a “governmental entity”) but not itself a “government” as that term is used in the terrorism definition, Gerou’s threats against DCS employees did not constitute threats to commit terrorism. However, the court found sufficient evidence supported convictions on the DCS counts as the lesser-included offense of Class A misdemeanor intimidation under Indiana Code section 35-45-2-1(a)(4). The court affirmed the Level 5 felony conviction for the Cornett count, finding sufficient evidence that Gerou’s conduct—including references to his gun, patting his hip, and threatening statements—constituted a threat to commit a forcible felony. The court also held that the three DCS offenses did not constitute a single episode of criminal conduct because they occurred on different dates and at different locations, so consecutive sentences were permissible.

Key Takeaways

  • The Indiana Department of Child Services is a “governmental entity” but not a “government” for purposes of the terrorism definition in Indiana Code section 35-31.5-2-329. Threats directed at DCS or its employees cannot, standing alone, be elevated to terrorism-level offenses through this statutory pathway.
  • This distinction between “government” and “governmental entity” may apply broadly to other state agencies. Prosecutors seeking terrorism enhancements for threats against state agency employees should consider whether the target qualifies as a “government” rather than merely a “governmental entity.”
  • Intimidation offenses committed against the same target organization but on different dates, at different locations, and through different individuals do not constitute a single “episode of criminal conduct” under Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2, allowing consecutive sentences without statutory caps.

Why It Matters

This decision draws a meaningful line in Indiana’s criminal code between threats directed at a “government” and those directed at individual state agencies. For prosecutors, it narrows the circumstances under which intimidation charges can be elevated to felonies through the terrorism enhancement. Threats against employees of state agencies like DCS—however serious—will generally need to be charged as misdemeanor intimidation unless the State can identify a separate basis for felony elevation, such as a threat to commit a forcible felony as with the Cornett count.

For Indiana practitioners handling CHINS and family law matters, the case serves as a reminder that threats made during contentious child welfare proceedings carry criminal consequences even when they do not reach the terrorism threshold. The court remanded for resentencing on the DCS counts as Class A misdemeanors, which carry a maximum of one year per count rather than the one-to-six-year range for Level 5 felonies. This could significantly reduce Gerou’s overall sentence on remand.

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