Background
Molly McGrane alleged that a fellow Culver student sexually assaulted her off campus in February 2019. In early 2020, she contacted a Culver mental-health counselor to discuss reporting the assault. Culver issued a no-contact order, and McGrane reported two occasions when the other student came within the required distance. On March 11, 2020, she formally disclosed the alleged assault. A Culver social worker contacted law enforcement that day, and Culver removed the other student from campus.
McGrane later asserted that Culver personnel had discouraged her from reporting. A March 2020 email said health-center staff warned that reporting could lead to her being forced to leave the school. She sued Culver for negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Her negligence theories included mishandling the report, discouraging disclosure, maintaining inadequate policies and procedures, and failing to train employees. She also invoked Indiana statutes requiring certain people to report suspected child abuse or neglect.
Culver moved for summary judgment. McGrane missed the response deadline, and the trial court struck her late filing, denied a continuance, and entered judgment for Culver. On appeal, she challenged those procedural rulings and the merits. The appellate court evaluated the motion using Culver’s own designated evidence because Indiana’s summary-judgment framework requires the moving party to affirmatively negate an element of the opponent’s claim; a movant cannot prevail merely by pointing to gaps in the nonmovant’s proof.
The Court’s Holding
The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the order striking McGrane’s untimely response and the denial of her requested continuance. It also affirmed summary judgment insofar as McGrane attempted to derive a private right of action directly from Indiana’s child-abuse reporting statutes. Those statutes did not themselves create an enforceable civil claim against Culver. The panel assumed without deciding, however, that Culver owed relevant common-law duties, and distinguished a statutory private-right claim from using statutory conduct within an ordinary negligence theory.
Judge Felix concluded that Culver did not carry its initial burden on McGrane’s remaining negligence theories. Culver’s evidence showed that personnel contacted law enforcement promptly after the formal disclosure, but it did not establish compliance with all potentially applicable duties. The record also contained McGrane’s contemporaneous email saying staff warned her that reporting might force her to leave, creating a factual dispute despite affidavits denying discouragement. Culver’s general statements that employees followed applicable policies did not identify those policies or show that they were reasonably maintained. Its evidence was likewise silent on employee training.
The same evidentiary shortfall defeated summary judgment on the emotional-distress claims. For negligent infliction, Culver did not negate the required direct-impact or bystander elements. For intentional infliction, the evidence did not establish what Culver’s conduct was, much less conclusively show that it was not extreme, outrageous, intentional, or reckless. The court therefore reversed judgment on those claims and on the common-law negligence theories, remanding for further proceedings. It did not determine that McGrane will ultimately prevail.
Key Takeaways
- An Indiana summary-judgment movant must affirmatively negate a claim element; silence in the designated record does not transfer the burden to the opposing party.
- A reporting statute may not create a private civil cause of action even when related common-law negligence theories remain viable.
- General affidavits asserting compliance with unidentified policies may be insufficient to establish reasonable policies, handling, or employee training as a matter of law.
- A late response can be struck without ending the case if the movant’s own evidence fails to satisfy its initial burden.
Why It Matters
McGrane reinforces Indiana’s comparatively demanding summary-judgment standard. Defense counsel cannot rely solely on the plaintiff’s missed deadline or lack of responsive evidence. The designated materials must address each pleaded theory and conclusively negate at least one necessary element. Institutions responding to assault allegations should preserve the operative policies, training materials, communications, and evidence of how personnel applied them; conclusory assurances of compliance may not support judgment before trial.
For plaintiffs, the opinion illustrates the importance of separating a nonexistent statutory private cause of action from a traditional tort claim informed by the same statutory setting. The decision leaves causation, damages, credibility, and the ultimate reasonableness of Culver’s response for later proceedings. Its immediate consequence is narrower but significant: most of McGrane’s claims may proceed despite her unsuccessful summary-judgment response.