Background
The Indiana Court of Appeals held that a trial court conducting resentencing after a successful direct appeal may consider a defendant’s conduct after the original sentence, including prison disciplinary history. The panel affirmed Jessika Terrell’s revised nine-year sentence because Indiana law does not freeze the resentencing record at the date of the first hearing. The opinion also expressly disagreed with an earlier Court of Appeals decision that had barred consideration of post-sentencing good behavior in this setting.
Terrell was originally convicted of three Level 5 felony kidnapping counts and three Level 6 felony interference-with-custody counts. The trial court imposed ten years, with four years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction and six years suspended to probation. In Terrell’s first appeal, the Court of Appeals held that entering convictions for both kidnapping and interference with custody violated double-jeopardy principles. It reversed the interference-with-custody convictions and sent the case back for resentencing on the kidnapping convictions.
On remand, the trial court imposed nine years, again requiring four years in the Department of Correction but suspending five years to probation. As an aggravating factor, the court cited Terrell’s poor institutional conduct after she entered prison. A Department of Correction progress report showed ten disciplinary write-ups during 2025. Terrell argued in her second appeal that a resentencing court could consider only evidence that existed when the original sentence was imposed.
The Court’s Holding
The court rejected that proposed temporal limit. It relied on Ousley v. State, which held that a court revising a sentence after a successful direct appeal or post-conviction challenge may consider the defendant’s post-sentencing behavior, whether favorable or unfavorable. Although Ousley itself followed post-conviction proceedings, its reasoning treated resentencing after post-conviction relief and resentencing after direct appeal alike. Terrell’s hearing therefore could account for her Department of Correction record accumulated after the first sentence.
The panel confronted Ingle v. State, a 2002 Court of Appeals decision holding that a resentencing court following reversal on direct appeal could not consider the defendant’s good behavior after the first sentence. Ingle relied on Edwards v. State, which concerned the narrower procedure for correcting an erroneous sentence under Indiana Code section 35-38-1-15. The Terrell panel concluded that a motion to correct erroneous sentence is materially more limited than a full resentencing after a successful appeal or post-conviction petition. It therefore stated that Ingle was wrongly decided.
Terrell alternatively argued that a list of prison write-ups did not prove actual misconduct because the record did not reveal whether the allegations were adjudicated, appealed, separately sanctioned, or supported by procedural safeguards. But she had not denied the misconduct or raised those objections when the report was discussed at resentencing. Her lawyer instead acknowledged that her prison performance had not been perfect. On that record, the Court of Appeals found neither error nor abuse of discretion in the trial court’s consideration of the report and affirmed.
Key Takeaways
- A full resentencing after a successful Indiana direct appeal may consider a defendant’s conduct occurring after the original sentencing, including both rehabilitation and misconduct.
- The more restrictive rules governing a motion to correct erroneous sentence do not define the evidentiary scope of resentencing after appellate or post-conviction relief.
- Objections to prison disciplinary reports should be developed at the resentencing hearing; failing to deny the conduct or challenge the report’s reliability can undermine the issue on appeal.
Why It Matters
Terrell gives Indiana trial courts a current, published answer about what belongs in the record when an appellate victory produces a new sentencing hearing. Resentencing is not simply a reconstruction of the original hearing. Both sides may have reason to gather evidence about the defendant’s intervening years: the defense can present rehabilitation, programming, or good conduct, while the State can offer documented violations and other unfavorable developments.
The decision is especially important for preserving evidentiary objections. Defense counsel should not wait until appeal to question whether disciplinary allegations were adjudicated, reliable, or procedurally sound. Counsel should request the underlying records, make a specific objection, and create a record about any pending review. Prosecutors likewise should be prepared to establish what a Department of Correction summary represents. Because the panel expressly rejected Ingle’s contrary approach, practitioners should now treat Ousley and Terrell as the operative framework for full resentencing proceedings.