Background
This judgment resolves the costs question arising from the principal decision in DPP v JP [2026] IEHC 350, in which the High Court (Bradley J.) held that the District Judge had erred in law by striking out seven criminal charges simpliciter — with no further order — when exercising jurisdiction under s. 13 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1967. The DPP had appealed by way of case stated, and the principal judgment found in her favour on that jurisdictional ground, namely that a contribution to the poor box was a necessary element of any valid strike-out order in the circumstances.
On the costs question, the DPP argued she was presumptively entitled to costs as the entirely successful party under s. 169(1) of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 and O. 99 of the Rules of the Superior Courts 1986. The respondent, J.P., opposed that application and sought his own costs, arguing he had succeeded on approximately 90% of the arguments actually contested. He also contended that the prosecution had never raised the poor-box contribution requirement before the District Judge, and that had it done so J.P. would in all likelihood have made such a contribution, rendering the case stated unnecessary entirely.
J.P. further submitted that the DPP’s written and oral submissions were framed largely as a de facto appeal against leniency of sentence rather than a pure point of law, pointing to passages in those submissions criticising the District Judge’s factual assessment of the offending and the absence of engagement with victims’ rights. In the alternative, J.P. sought no order as to costs.
The Court’s Holding
Bradley J. exercised the discretion afforded by the “unless the court orders otherwise” proviso in s. 169(1) of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 and made no order as to costs. While acknowledging that the default rule is costs follow the event for a wholly successful party, the court found that the specific circumstances of the case warranted departure from that default.
The court placed particular weight on two considerations. First, the jurisdictional requirement of a poor-box contribution — the very point on which the principal judgment turned — had not been raised or canvassed before the District Judge, and the prosecuting Inspector had adopted a neutral stance when the District Judge indicated she intended to strike out the charges. Second, in any litigation there is an ebb and flow to submissions, and both parties had advanced arguments that were not ultimately accepted; for example, the parties disagreed on the ratio of DPP v Ryan [2011] IEHC 280 and on the utility of remittal, and neither side was wholly vindicated in its legal framing.
Key Takeaways
- The default costs rule under s. 169(1) of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 — costs follow the event for the wholly successful party — is not absolute; courts retain a meaningful discretion informed by the factors at ss. 169(1)(a)–(g).
- Where the legal point that ultimately decides a case stated was never put to the trial court by the party who later succeeds on it, that failure can weigh against a costs award even in favour of the winning party.
- The framing of submissions as a de facto merits or leniency appeal, rather than a clean point of law, is a relevant consideration in exercising the costs discretion on a case stated.
- A no-order-as-to-costs outcome is available even where one party is nominally entirely successful, if the overall conduct and circumstances of the proceedings make it just.
Why It Matters
This decision offers a practical illustration of how Irish courts apply the post-2019 costs framework in criminal appellate proceedings. It signals that a party appealing by way of case stated cannot assume that winning on the point of law guarantees a costs award; if the winning argument was never ventilated at first instance — and could have been — that omission may justify withholding costs entirely.
For practitioners, the judgment underscores the importance of ensuring that all legally material issues, including jurisdictional prerequisites such as the poor-box requirement recognised in DPP v Ryan, are placed squarely before the trial court. Failure to do so not only risks creating unnecessary appellate litigation but may also leave the ostensibly successful appellant out of pocket on costs.