Background
Teresa and Seán Barrington were registered owners of a commercial warehouse at Unit J, Oldenway Commercial Park, Ballybrit, Galway, from which Seán operated a flooring business. In 2005 they executed a mortgage over the property in favour of Ulster Bank securing borrowings ultimately in the region of €892,000. After an interest-only period expired, Ulster Bank issued a formal demand for repayment in November 2011. The plaintiffs declined to repay, contending that the bank had breached its own contract by issuing the demand and that this breach cancelled all of their obligations under the loan. The charge was subsequently transferred to Promontoria (Oyster) DAC, a receiver was appointed in May 2018, and on 29 December 2022 M.R.C.S. Ltd (the sixth named defendant) was registered as full owner with title absolute following a sale by Promontoria, notwithstanding a lis pendens the second named plaintiff had registered in September 2022.
The plaintiffs remained in occupation until 9 April 2025, when agents of M.R.C.S. Ltd attended the premises at approximately 5:30 a.m. and took physical possession. The plaintiffs, alerted by their security cameras, arrived during the operation and a confrontation ensued. The first named plaintiff obtained emergency ex parte interim relief from Cregan J on 11 April 2025 restraining the sale or transfer of the property and the removal or damage of its contents. The present application, brought by Teresa Barrington in her own name but explicitly on behalf of both plaintiffs, was a motion for interlocutory injunction seeking restoration of possession, an ongoing restraint on any sale, and prevention of further damage to the premises and its contents.
The application came before Jordan J after a lengthy procedural history in which the plaintiffs had already failed in a first interlocutory application before Nolan J (June 2024, costs awarded against them), a set-aside application before Twomey J (March 2025), an application to the Court of Appeal for an extension of time to appeal Nolan J’s order (refused October 2025), and an appeal of Twomey J’s decision (dismissed by Butler J, with Whelan J and Faherty J, November 2025). Throughout, the plaintiffs have largely acted as litigants in person.
The Court’s Holding
Jordan J refused the interlocutory injunction. The court found the plaintiffs’ core contention — that Ulster Bank’s issuance of the November 2011 demand letter constituted a breach of contract that extinguished all their repayment obligations and effectively gave them ownership of the warehouse free of any charge — to be “fanciful,” to “stretch credulity,” and to be “devoid of reason or logic.” The court observed that the plaintiffs had entered into a commercial loan, had apparently made no repayments since 2011, and yet asserted an entitlement to retain the warehouse free and clear of a liability that had by then grown well beyond €892,000. The loan documents themselves provided that capital and interest repayments would “begin” after the interest-only period — they did not make repayment conditional on a subsequent separate agreement being reached, contrary to the plaintiffs’ reading.
The court was equally dismissive of the related argument that Promontoria could not validly have been assigned the Ulster Bank charge because the mortgage sale deed pre-dated Promontoria’s incorporation — noting that this assertion was made in an application to which Promontoria was not a party and had had no opportunity to respond, and that the same applied to other defendants whose alleged wrongdoing was extensively aired in the plaintiffs’ affidavits. The court declined to make a site visit to the warehouse, finding that photographic and video evidence was sufficient for the purposes of the interlocutory hearing. Repeated allegations of fraud were characterised as unsupported by the evidence placed before the court. The legal position was clear: M.R.C.S. Ltd was the registered owner of the property with title absolute from 29 December 2022, and it had been entitled to take possession.
The constitutional challenge to s.62(6) of the Registration of Title Act 1964 — and the broader challenge to the Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Act 2013 on the basis that it treats pre- and post-December 2009 mortgages unequally — was noted as a matter for the full plenary hearing. However, the court observed that neither plaintiff had taken any worthwhile steps to advance the substantive action in the more than twelve months since the interim order of April 2025, and that an amended Statement of Claim was only then being considered.
Key Takeaways
- A mortgagor’s argument that a bank’s letter of demand — issued after an interest-only period expired without agreed capital repayment terms — constituted a contractual breach that extinguished all repayment obligations was rejected as entirely without merit.
- A lis pendens does not prevent a mortgagee in possession from completing a sale and obtaining registration; the registered title of the purchaser will be treated as valid for interlocutory purposes unless the plaintiffs can demonstrate a stateable ground for impeaching it.
- Allegations of fraud made in interlocutory affidavits without evidential support will carry no weight; courts will not treat repetition of such allegations as a substitute for proof.
- Constitutional challenges to mortgage enforcement legislation remain live for plenary determination, but will not by themselves sustain interlocutory relief where the plaintiffs’ underlying factual case is not stateable and the proceedings have not been diligently advanced.
Why It Matters
The decision is a pointed reminder to borrowers — and their advisers — that creative arguments about contractual breach extinguishing mortgage debt face an extremely high scepticism threshold. Jordan J’s unambiguous language (“fanciful,” “devoid of reason or logic”) signals that courts will not allow the interlocutory injunction mechanism to be used to preserve occupation of secured property where the mortgagor’s substantive case lacks any credible foundation, regardless of how passionately held. The procedural history — five failed applications across two court levels within two years — also underscores the costs and reputational risks of prolonged resistance to lawful enforcement.
The case additionally illustrates the limits of a lis pendens as a protective device: registration did not prevent the sale to M.R.C.S. Ltd from being completed and perfected, leaving the plaintiffs to challenge the title of a bona fide registered owner — a considerably heavier task. Practitioners advising mortgagors facing enforcement will want to note both the factual findings and the court’s unequivocal endorsement of the registered owner’s right to recover possession.