Background
In October 2021, the Central District Court (Lod) ruled in favor of the Israel Land Authority (ILA) against Moshe Green, ordering him to pay fair-use fees for unauthorized occupation of land — including operation of an events hall and use of a commercial area. The judgment set out the calculation methodology but did not fix a monetary sum; it directed the ILA to prepare a detailed schedule of amounts and submit it for judicial endorsement. On February 7, 2022, a formally endorsed court order (פסיקתה) was signed, itemizing the obligation at roughly NIS 3.6 million in use fees plus court costs and attorney fees, with payment in 48 installments carrying linkage and interest. The Central District Attorney’s office subsequently instructed Green to make payments through two separate channels: attorney fees to the Ministry of Justice and the balance directly to the ILA.
Green claims he discharged every obligation in full — paying the ILA 49 installments totaling NIS 4,054,220 and paying the Ministry of Justice NIS 154,770.90. Notwithstanding this, the ILA opened a first enforcement file in November 2022 for roughly NIS 100,000 in allegedly unpaid attorney fees. That file was closed by the enforcement registrar in December 2025 on procedural grounds, though the registrar expressly noted the closure did not constitute res judicata and that a new file could be opened. Green’s appeal of the registrar’s ruling was dismissed as moot by the Tel Aviv Magistrate Court in June 2026.
Before that appeal was decided, the ILA had already opened a second enforcement file in February 2026, this time claiming approximately NIS 420,000 in unpaid interest and linkage differentials. Two months later, the ILA sought to amend the claimed debt upward to NIS 755,688, asserting that VAT had not been charged on certain components of the original judgment. Green filed a “payment-in-full” (פרעתי) challenge to the second file, which was stayed pending resolution. On May 27, 2026, Green petitioned the High Court of Justice, arguing that the ILA was systematically abusing its status as a public authority — for retaliatory reasons — by repeatedly opening new enforcement proceedings against him, each time advancing fresh interpretations of the same court order to inflate the claimed debt.
The Court’s Holding
Writing for a panel of three justices, Justice Yechiel Kasher dismissed the petition on the threshold for failure to exhaust an adequate alternative remedy. The foundational rule, the Court reaffirmed, is that the HCJ will decline to hear a petition where another forum can grant effective relief. The Court had earlier directed Green to explain why the ongoing enforcement proceedings did not provide precisely such a forum, and his response — that the enforcement office lacks power to order the ILA to cease all future proceedings — did not persuade the Court.
The Court held that the scope of a debtor’s “payment-in-full” challenge under Section 19(a) of the Enforcement Law, 5727-1967, is not confined to a bare assertion that the monetary debt has been paid. Citing Civil Appeal Leave 4992/18, Gutman v. Bank Discount of Israel (January 7, 2019), the Court reiterated that any post-judgment fact capable of exempting a debtor — wholly or partially — from satisfying the judgment is cognizable in such a challenge, including a claim of bad faith in opening or conducting enforcement proceedings. Green’s core allegation — that the ILA is pursuing him in bad faith through the second enforcement file and the amended-debt application — falls squarely within that category and must be litigated there first.
On the narrower question of whether the HCJ could issue a sweeping injunction blocking the ILA from ever opening future enforcement files, the Court acknowledged that such a remedy lies beyond the enforcement registrar’s jurisdiction. It nonetheless declined to grant it, characterizing the relief as “extreme” and reserved for only the most exceptional circumstances — cases in which “all avenues have been exhausted” — citing Civil Appeal Leave 8784/23, Abu Yahia Construction Co. v. Y. Li-Da Investments Ltd. (February 28, 2024). No such circumstances were present here, where an active enforcement proceeding remained pending before the competent tribunal. The petition was dismissed without an award of costs.
Key Takeaways
- The HCJ will dismiss a petition on the threshold where an adequate alternative remedy exists; a petitioner’s disagreement with the scope of that remedy does not itself transform the case into one warranting HCJ intervention.
- The “payment-in-full” challenge under Section 19(a) of Israel’s Enforcement Law is broad enough to encompass allegations that the creditor opened or is conducting enforcement proceedings in bad faith — making the enforcement forum the appropriate venue for such claims before the HCJ steps in.
- An injunction permanently barring a creditor from opening any future enforcement proceedings is an extreme remedy available only in the rarest exceptional cases; serial use of enforcement proceedings, even if aggressive, does not automatically reach that threshold.
- The administrative law principle that a public authority must act in good faith applies in enforcement contexts, but the enforcement registrar — not the HCJ — is ordinarily the first arbiter of whether that duty has been breached.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the HCJ’s consistent doctrine of judicial restraint in cases involving ongoing enforcement proceedings. For practitioners, it clarifies that allegations of bad-faith enforcement — even when leveled against a powerful state body such as the ILA — must ordinarily be tested in the enforcement forum through a “payment-in-full” challenge before the HCJ will exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. The ruling sends a clear signal that creative framing of enforcement disputes as administrative-law violations will not, on its own, unlock HCJ review.
The case also highlights a practical tension that arises when a court order specifies a calculation method without a fixed sum: interpretive disputes about the resulting debt can generate successive enforcement files, each based on a revised reading of the underlying judgment. The Court’s decision leaves debtors facing such a cycle to press their bad-faith arguments within the enforcement system rather than obtaining a preemptive HCJ order halting future filings — a demanding posture that places the initial burden squarely on the debtor to litigate each enforcement round in the statutory forum.