Background
Sanaa Hassoun petitioned against a confiscation and demolition order issued under Regulation 119 of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945. The order covered two floors of a three-story building in Beit Imrin: the apartment where she lived with her husband and two adult children, and a floor used for storage and as a sheep pen. Her husband was charged with intentionally causing the death of Yehuda Sherman and attempting intentionally to cause the deaths of two others.
According to the indictment, on March 21, 2026, Hassoun’s husband deliberately rammed his vehicle into an open-sided off-road vehicle carrying three civilians whom he identified by their appearance as Jews. The off-road vehicle rolled down a cliff, throwing out its occupants; Sherman died from his injuries and another occupant was injured. Hassoun argued that the incident was a traffic accident rather than a nationally motivated attack, that she alone owned the building, that her husband lacked a sufficient connection to the livestock floor, and that demolishing property used by uninvolved relatives was disproportionate. She alternatively sought to limit the order to the residential floor.
The Court’s Holding
The Court unanimously dismissed the petition. Justice Yael Wilner, joined by President Yitzhak Amit and Justice David Mintz, held that the military commander’s order was reasonable and proportionate. The Court declined to revisit general challenges to the legality of Regulation 119, explaining that its precedents had repeatedly rejected those arguments and that they need not be reconsidered in every individual petition.
The Court found the evidentiary basis sufficient. Administrative evidence alone may support action under Regulation 119 without an indictment or conviction, and here an indictment had already been filed. Confidential material and the husband’s recorded interrogation supported, at least to the required administrative-evidence standard, the conclusion that the collision was an intentional, nationally motivated attack rather than an accident.
The husband’s lack of ownership did not prevent application of Regulation 119 because residence, not title, is the relevant connection. His connection extended to the livestock floor: he used it daily, independently managed the sheep operation there, hosted acquaintances and sometimes slept there, and stored weapons there. Although his relatives were not implicated in the attack, their innocence did not by itself preclude demolition for deterrent purposes. Given the attack’s gravity, the evidence, the husband’s substantial connection to both floors, the order’s limited scope, and planned measures to reduce collateral damage, the Court upheld the entire order.
Key Takeaways
- Regulation 119 may be invoked on the basis of sufficiently persuasive administrative evidence; a criminal conviction, or even an indictment, is not required.
- A perpetrator need not own the targeted property. It is enough that the person resides there or has a sufficiently substantial and frequent connection to the relevant part of the structure.
- The absence of family members’ involvement is relevant to proportionality but does not automatically bar demolition undertaken for deterrence.
Why It Matters
The decision reaffirms the Supreme Court of Israel’s established approach to punitive-deterrent demolitions under Regulation 119 and its unwillingness to reopen broad legal challenges to the measure in each individual case. It also illustrates that a qualifying connection can extend beyond living quarters to a nonresidential floor that the alleged attacker regularly controlled and used.
At the same time, the ruling confirms that each order remains subject to reasonableness and proportionality review, including scrutiny of the offense’s severity, the strength of the evidence, the attacker’s connection to the property, the effect on uninvolved occupants, the order’s physical scope, and measures intended to limit damage to untargeted property.