Background
The petitioners are residents of two villages—Safai and Maj’az—located in “Fire Zone 918,” a military-controlled area in southern Hebron declared a closed military zone in the early 1980s and subject to a closure order since 1999. Beginning in 2016, the petitioners sought to submit building plans for their communities. Following initial litigation, the Supreme Court noted that authorities had committed to discussing the plans with residents, though such discussions did not occur until 2020.
In June 2025, the High Planning Council (MTP) issued guidelines directing planning sub-committees to reject planning applications in Fire Zone 918 “out of the necessity to preserve the area for military use alone, and generally not to permit civilian planning.” The guidelines were based on a position stated by the Central Command on June 17, 2025, that the zone “should be preserved for the military alone.” Subsequently, in July 2025, planning sub-committees rejected both the Safai and Maj’az plans, citing both the lack of military commander approval and professional planning deficiencies.
The Court’s Holding
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition as moot due to the existence of an adequate alternative remedy. The court held that petitioners must pursue their claims before the Administrative Court in Jerusalem, which has jurisdiction over decisions of planning authorities under planning law. The court concluded that both the MTP’s June 2025 decision and the sub-committees’ rejections fell within the Administrative Court’s jurisdiction because they involved exercises of powers delegated under the Planning and Building Law and related ordinances.
Although the petitioners argued that the issue involved constitutional and security matters requiring Supreme Court review, and that humanitarian considerations and pending related litigation (including HCJ 598/22, decided December 4, 2025) created special circumstances warranting the Supreme Court’s intervention, the court declined to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. The court found that none of these factors overcame the doctrine of alternative remedies, and that the Administrative Court was fully capable of addressing any humanitarian considerations relevant to the petitioners’ claims.
Key Takeaways
- Israeli courts will generally defer jurisdiction to specialized forums (here, the Administrative Court) when an adequate alternative remedy exists, even in cases involving security areas and fundamental rights.
- The High Planning Council may issue guidelines directing subordinate committees how to exercise delegated planning authority, including conditioning consideration of applications on military approval.
- Decisions by planning sub-committees in security areas remain subject to administrative law review despite their connection to military command authority.
- The Supreme Court will not second-guess procedural decisions to require primary legislation to regulate planning in security zones when an alternative judicial remedy is available.
Why It Matters
This decision reflects a significant jurisdictional boundary in Israeli administrative law: while the Supreme Court reviews military decisions on security grounds, decisions labeled “planning” matters—even those intimately tied to military policy—may be referred to the Administrative Court. For Palestinian residents in closed military zones, this creates a two-step remedy: administrative review of planning decisions, after which military authority must separately approve any planning. The decision’s reliance on an alternative remedy doctrine effectively shields the June 2025 MTP guideline from direct Supreme Court scrutiny despite its sweeping policy implications, leaving petitioners to challenge it indirectly through the planning sub-committees’ rejection decisions in a lower forum.
The court’s reference to the December 2025 Abu Aram decision—which upheld the requirement that planning applications in closed security areas first obtain military approval before planning committees may consider them—suggests a pattern of deferential review in this sensitive area. The ruling raises questions about whether procedural categorization (as “planning” rather than “security”) can legitimately remove matters of significant humanitarian import from the Supreme Court’s review, particularly where the ultimate effect is to foreclose substantive consideration of civilian planning rights in populated areas under military control.