Background
Johnny Ruiz Plasino, a Venezuelan national born in 1971, has resided in Israel since 2004. He entered on a B/2 tourist visa valid for three months but was arrested during that period for working without a permit, and deportation and detention orders were issued against him. He then filed an asylum request with the UNHCR, which secured his release from detention. In April 2006, the authorities granted him a B/1 work and residency visa, valid through the end of 2009. On February 21, 2010, he submitted a formal asylum application to the Israeli state, and the following day received a temporary residency license under Section 2(a)(5) of the Entry to Israel Law, 5712-1952 — a status designed for individuals subject to a removal order who remain in Israel pending departure or deportation. That license was repeatedly renewed and remained in force until October 10, 2023.
In 2019, the Refugee Status Determination (RSD) unit of the Population and Immigration Authority reviewed his application. Plasino claimed he faced persecution in Venezuela based on political activity and a fear for his life upon return. On February 2, 2022, the Authority adopted the RSD unit’s recommendation and rejected his application, finding material contradictions in his account, insufficient substantiation of his claimed fear, and no established asylum ground. He appealed to the statutory Appeals Tribunal (the Immigration Appeals Board under the Entry to Israel Law, 5712-1952), which dismissed the appeal. The Tribunal found no well-founded fear of political persecution, no substantial ties to Israel, and held that the lengthy administrative delay in processing his application — while regrettable — did not independently justify a grant of humanitarian status. It also rejected his claim of “evidentiary damage” arising from the Authority’s loss of video recordings of his 2019 interviews, finding those interviews were adequately documented by other means.
Plasino then appealed to the Jerusalem District Court sitting as an Administrative Court. On October 26, 2025, the court dismissed the appeal on the written record pursuant to Civil Procedure Regulations 138(a)(5) and 148(b), adding that in any event he had not demonstrated substantial familial, social, or professional ties to Israel, and that administrative delays alone could not create such ties. That ruling prompted the present application to the Supreme Court for leave to appeal (a third-round proceeding) and an emergency stay of enforcement.
The Court’s Holding
Justice Yael Wilner denied the application for leave to appeal. She reaffirmed the well-established principle that leave to appeal in a third round — from a decision of the Immigration Appeals Board through the District Court to the Supreme Court — is granted only in exceptional cases: where a fundamental legal question arises that transcends the private interests of the parties, where there is a real risk of a miscarriage of justice, or where other extraordinary circumstances exist. Despite the petitioner’s attempt to frame his arguments in principled terms, the Court found that the application focused entirely on the specific factual circumstances of his case and on the application of settled law to those facts. His arguments were directed primarily at factual and credibility findings — namely, the determination that his account contained material contradictions and that no well-founded fear of political persecution had been established. Appellate courts do not disturb factual and credibility findings made by the primary tribunal, and that principle applies with even greater force in a third-round proceeding. No miscarriage of justice was found.
On the question of administrative delay, Justice Wilner stressed that the years-long delay in issuing a final decision on Plasino’s asylum application was “far from satisfactory,” and she underscored that the Authority is obligated to process asylum applications promptly, efficiently, and within a reasonable time. Nonetheless, she upheld the lower courts’ conclusion that delay, standing alone, does not constitute an independent ground for granting asylum or humanitarian status — it cannot convert an unsubstantiated claim into a meritorious one.
On the costs question, the Court noted an apparent internal inconsistency in the District Court’s judgment: one portion of the relevant paragraph stated that “no costs will be awarded in this court,” while a later clause ordered the petitioner to pay 4,000 NIS in costs to the respondent. Without ruling definitively on the matter, the Court observed that a remedy is available: the petitioner may apply to the District Court for correction of that apparent clerical or logical error. The Supreme Court issued no costs order of its own. To allow the petitioner time to organize his affairs following the dismissal, the Court ordered the Authority to refrain from deporting Plasino for a period of ninety days from the date of the decision.
Key Takeaways
- Third-round leave to appeal from Immigration Appeals Board decisions will be granted only where a supra-individual legal question, a miscarriage of justice, or truly exceptional circumstances exist — challenges to factual and credibility findings do not meet that threshold.
- Lengthy administrative delay in processing an asylum application, while criticized by the Supreme Court as unacceptable, does not by itself create an independent legal basis for granting asylum or humanitarian residency status.
- A 90-day administrative grace period before deportation may be ordered as a humanitarian measure even when the substantive appeal is denied, to allow the applicant to arrange personal affairs.
- Where a lower court judgment contains an internal contradiction on the question of costs, the proper remedy is a correction application to that court rather than an appeal to a higher instance.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the stringent gatekeeping standard applied to third-round leave to appeal in Israeli immigration cases, clarifying that repackaging factual disputes in principled language will not suffice to clear that bar. It is a significant signal to asylum seekers and their counsel that credibility assessments made by the RSD unit and the Appeals Tribunal are highly durable and will rarely be revisited at the Supreme Court level absent a genuine systemic or legal question.
At the same time, the Court’s pointed rebuke of the Authority’s years-long processing delay carries normative weight: even without granting relief in the instant case, Justice Wilner placed on record an explicit obligation of timeliness and efficiency in asylum adjudication. Combined with the 90-day deportation stay, the decision signals that procedural fairness considerations remain relevant — not as a trump card for applicants, but as a standard of conduct by which the Authority will be held accountable going forward.