Background
A 44-year-old man underwent an elective tonsillectomy at HaEmek Hospital. Two days later, while at home, he suffered a massive hemorrhage and was rushed to Baruch Padeh Medical Center in Poriya, where he underwent emergency surgery. Several days after that surgery he suffered a second massive hemorrhage and died. His widow and three children (the appellants) filed a medical negligence claim in the Central-Lod District Court against Poriya Medical Center and the Ministry of Health, seeking damages for personal injury and wrongful death.
After approximately three and a half years of litigation — including expert medical opinions and multiple evidentiary hearings — Judge S.M. Mizrahi of the District Court dismissed the claim on April 9, 2026. No costs order was made; each side was left to bear its own legal expenses.
Following the dismissal, the District Court registry issued a demand to the appellants for the remaining balance of the court fee — NIS 48,488 — pursuant to Regulation 5(b)(7) of the Courts Regulations (Fees), 5767-2007, which governs the deferred-payment scheme applicable to personal injury damages claims. The appellants filed an appeal to the Supreme Court and, alongside it, a motion to stay payment of the outstanding fee balance pending the outcome of the appeal.
The Court’s Holding
Deputy President Noam Sohlberg denied the motion. The court held that although the appellants styled their request as a “stay of execution,” no true stay of execution of a judgment was at issue. Court fees are not a form of relief granted within a judgment; they constitute an independent and separate statutory obligation. Settled Supreme Court authority — including Maor v. Amishrgas, CA 1339/14 (Jan. 6, 2015), and several subsequent decisions — makes clear that “the proper route for a motion to stay payment of a court fee is an application to the trial court,” not to the appellate court in the context of an appeal.
The appellants relied on an earlier ruling by Justice Sohlberg himself (CA 2624/18, May 2, 2018) in which he had been willing to treat an identical request as an exceptional motion for interim relief notwithstanding the procedural difficulty. The court distinguished that precedent: it had been granted only after deliberation and solely because the humanitarian circumstances of that case were “extraordinarily exceptional.” Later case law had already confirmed the ruling was “reserved for rare cases only” (CA 3762/23, Oct. 31, 2023) and could not be taken as establishing a general procedural path.
The court further noted that the correct procedural route — an application to the District Court — would have also opened two additional avenues: (1) a request for full or partial exemption from the court fee under Regulations 14(b)–(c) of the Fee Regulations, available specifically to personal injury plaintiffs (and subject to a 15-day deadline from the due date, extendable under the general power to extend time), and (2) a request for deferral of payment under Regulation 14(z) and Section 90(2) of the Courts Law (Consolidated Version), 5744-1984. Without expressing any view on the merits of such requests, the court stated its confidence that a well-founded application, if filed with the District Court, “would meet a receptive ear and be considered in the usual manner.”
Key Takeaways
- Court fees are a statutory obligation independent of the judgment itself; a motion to stay their payment must be directed to the trial court, not raised as a “stay of execution” in the appellate court.
- The narrow exception carved out for staying court-fee payments at the appellate level is reserved for cases with truly extraordinary humanitarian circumstances and cannot be generalized into a routine procedural option.
- Personal injury plaintiffs facing a residual court-fee demand after dismissal have specific statutory tools available at the trial-court level: an application for full or partial fee exemption (Regulation 14(b)–(c)) and an application for deferral of payment (Regulation 14(z)), both of which may be pursued even after the fee due date with leave of court.
- No costs were awarded, consistent with the District Court’s approach of leaving each side to bear its own expenses in this litigation.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces a well-established but frequently misapplied procedural rule in Israeli civil litigation: the appellate court is not the proper forum for challenging court-fee obligations, even when an appeal of the underlying judgment is pending. Plaintiffs — particularly those who lost personal injury claims and now face a deferred fee demand — must return to the trial court to seek relief, whether by way of exemption or deferral.
For practitioners advising clients in medical negligence or other personal injury matters, the ruling serves as a practical reminder that the deferred court-fee regime under Regulation 5(b) creates a contingent financial liability upon dismissal, and that the time-sensitive exemption procedure under Regulation 14(b) — with its 15-day window from the fee due date — should be considered proactively, not only after an appellate stay motion has failed.