Background
On 17 April 2025, Dina Haviv was driving with her partner and their infant son when the vehicle veered into oncoming traffic and collided head-on with another car. Her partner was killed; Haviv, the infant, and the other driver each sustained varying degrees of bodily injury. On 4 February 2026 an indictment was filed against Haviv in the Safed Traffic Magistrate’s Court, charging her with causing death by negligence and with reckless driving causing serious bodily harm and property damage.
Alongside the indictment, the prosecution applied to suspend Haviv’s driving licence pending the conclusion of proceedings under Section 46b of the Traffic Ordinance [New Version]. On 31 May 2026, after an oral hearing, the Magistrate’s Court (Judge Ben Hamo) granted the application and ordered the licence suspended until final judgment. Haviv appealed to the Nof HaGalil–Nazareth District Court, which dismissed the appeal on 7 June 2026 (Judge Atrash, Deputy President). She then sought leave to bring a further appeal before the Supreme Court.
The Court’s Holding
Deputy President Sohlberg dismissed the application for leave to appeal. He reiterated the settled rule that a “third-tier” leave to appeal is granted only in exceptional cases raising a fundamental legal question that transcends the specific facts, or in otherwise unusual circumstances — neither of which was present here.
The court explained the governing statutory framework: Section 46b(a) of the Traffic Ordinance requires a court to suspend the licence of any defendant indicted for an offence that caused a fatal road accident, while Section 46b(b) permits the court to refrain from suspension only if it is persuaded — with stated reasons — that the defendant’s continued driving poses no danger to the public. This creates a statutory presumption of dangerousness. Crucially, counsel for Haviv had focused his submissions at every level on alleged delay in filing the suspension application and on the tragic circumstances of the accident, but had never presented substantive arguments directed at rebutting the presumption of danger — he did not address Haviv’s driving history or the specific circumstances of the collision in any depth. The Magistrate’s Court was therefore correct to find the presumption unrebutted, and neither the District Court nor the Supreme Court had grounds to intervene.
The court noted that the matter is not closed: under Section 49 of the Traffic Ordinance, Haviv remains entitled to apply to the Magistrate’s Court for reconsideration of the suspension order. Deputy President Sohlberg also took the opportunity to rebuke counsel for the manner in which the petitions had been drafted across all three levels — for failing to make substantive, law-based arguments supported by statutory provisions and case-law precedents, and for using language toward the bench that was not appropriate. The court observed that this approach had not served the petitioner’s interests, particularly given that her liberty was at stake.
Key Takeaways
- Section 46b of the Traffic Ordinance creates a mandatory statutory presumption of dangerousness for defendants indicted in connection with a fatal road accident; to avoid suspension the defendant must affirmatively rebut that presumption by showing no public danger from continued driving.
- Third-tier leave to appeal in the Supreme Court from interlocutory licence-suspension decisions is reserved for cases raising a principled legal question or truly exceptional circumstances; general arguments about procedural delay or tragic personal context do not suffice.
- A defendant whose pre-trial licence suspension is upheld retains the avenue of applying for reconsideration under Section 49 of the Traffic Ordinance as circumstances develop.
- Counsel presenting applications to court must make substantive, law-grounded arguments and maintain appropriate professional language; failure to do so may actively harm the client.
Why It Matters
This short but pointed decision reaffirms the near-automatic character of pre-trial licence suspension in fatal-accident prosecutions under Israeli traffic law. It signals that defendants and their counsel cannot satisfy the statutory rebuttal standard — that continued driving poses no danger — simply by pointing to the tragic or unusual circumstances of the accident, or by raising procedural objections to the timing of the suspension application. Affirmative, evidence-based submissions about the driver’s safety record and the specific circumstances of the collision are required.
The court’s public reprimand of counsel is a notable secondary feature of the decision. It underscores the Israeli Supreme Court’s expectation that even in emotionally charged matters — here, a mother facing criminal charges after the death of her partner — advocates must engage rigorously with the relevant law and maintain respectful professional standards, since failure to do so ultimately prejudices the very client the advocate is meant to serve.