Background
In March 2017, Nathaniel Breazeale was the sole caregiver for his girlfriend’s one-year-old son, Charlie, who was ill with vomiting. Later that day, the child’s mother discovered the boy had numerous bruises covering his body and took him to the hospital. Emergency physicians discovered catastrophic injuries: a transected pancreas requiring surgical removal of portions, severe intestinal damage requiring duodenum removal, approximately ten ounces of internal bleeding, a broken tibia, and a vertebral compression fracture. Charlie spent twelve days hospitalized, eight of which were in intensive care on a ventilator. Medical experts testified the injuries were consistent with stomping, kicking, or punching force applied to the abdomen and that the child’s survival at the time was not certain.
Breazeale was charged with assault in the first degree and criminal abuse in the first degree. At trial, the defense theory was that Charlie’s injuries resulted when Breazeale struck him on the back while attempting to perform the Heimlich Maneuver to prevent choking. A jury convicted Breazeale on both counts, and he received a thirty-year sentence. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal to the Kentucky Supreme Court in 2020.
Breazeale subsequently filed a motion under Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.42 claiming ineffective assistance of counsel on two grounds: trial counsel failed to call a Heimlich Maneuver expert witness, and failed to retain an independent mental health expert. The trial court denied the motion following an evidentiary hearing. Breazeale appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of both ineffective assistance claims, applying the two-prong Strickland v. Washington standard requiring proof of both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. On the Heimlich Maneuver expert claim, the court found no deficient performance. Although trial counsel had consulted with Andrea Tyson, a registered nurse and American Heart Association Heimlich instructor, both pre-trial and trial counsel reasonably decided not to call her as a witness. Tyson testified at the hearing that striking a child on the back is not the proper method for performing the Heimlich Maneuver on an eighteen-month-old and that she had never observed injuries as severe as Charlie’s result from improper Heimlich performance. The court emphasized that Tyson’s own expert testimony—that the injuries were instead consistent with a traumatic automobile accident—directly contradicted the defense narrative, making the strategic decision to exclude her testimony sound trial strategy rather than deficient performance.
On the independent mental health expert claim, the court found no deficient performance. Breazeale had undergone comprehensive psychiatric evaluation at Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center (KCPC) where he was found competent to stand trial and criminally responsible for his conduct. KCPC evaluators diagnosed Antisocial Personality Disorder, Conduct Disorder, and multiple substance use disorders, but concluded Breazeale did not suffer from mental illness affecting his ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his behavior to law. Breazeale had ample opportunity during an extensive week-long KCPC evaluation to raise mental health concerns but did not. The court held that trial counsel reasonably relied on this thorough court-ordered evaluation without seeking independent assessment. Because Breazeale failed to establish deficient performance under Strickland’s first prong, both claims failed.
Key Takeaways
- Trial counsel’s strategic decisions about witness presentation, including whom not to call, receive substantial deference and are not deficient assistance unless falling outside the range of professionally reasonable conduct.
- Expert testimony that contradicts or undermines a defense theory may be strategically excluded; counsel’s decision to forego such testimony reflects reasonable judgment, not deficiency.
- When comprehensive court-ordered psychiatric evaluations have been conducted, counsel’s reliance on those reports without seeking independent assessment is generally sound strategy under Strickland.
- Ineffective assistance claims require satisfaction of both prongs of Strickland; failure on either element defeats relief, even if alternative strategies might theoretically have been stronger.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces Kentucky appellate courts’ substantial deference to trial-level strategic decision-making in ineffective assistance claims. The opinion demonstrates that courts will not second-guess tactical judgments about witness selection or expert retention unless counsel’s choice was objectively unreasonable—a high bar to satisfy. For defense practitioners, the holding confirms that court-ordered comprehensive evaluations (such as KCPC reports) carry significant weight; relying on such evaluations rather than pursuing independent opinions constitutes professionally reasonable conduct.
The case also illustrates a tactical reality: evidence that appears helpful in the abstract may actually undermine a particular defense theory, and competent counsel may strategically exclude such evidence. Courts recognize this judgment and do not penalize counsel for choices that, though perhaps not optimal in hindsight, reflect reasonable trial strategy. The Strickland standard, as applied here, imposes a substantial barrier to post-conviction relief based on strategic decisions, requiring the defendant to show not merely that other approaches existed, but that counsel’s chosen approach fell below objective reasonableness and prejudiced the defense.