Background
Luther Parente and Eric Stewart, both incarcerated at Rhode Island’s Adult Correctional Institutions, sustained ankle injuries before their incarceration and alleged that the Rhode Island Department of Corrections (RIDOC) failed to accommodate their medical needs — denying them elevator access, forcing them to traverse metal stairways multiple times daily, and withholding elevation pillows and other items prescribed for their injuries. Among several claims, they brought a count under the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act of 1990 (RICRA), alleging RIDOC discriminated against them by denying reasonable medical accommodations and the full and equal benefit of the law.
The federal district court denied RIDOC’s motion for summary judgment on the RICRA count, concluding that Rhode Island’s State Tort Claims Act (STCA) waived sovereign immunity for the claim because discrimination actions sound in tort. RIDOC appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, finding the question unsettled under Rhode Island law, certified it to the Rhode Island Supreme Court: whether RICRA discrimination claims are “actions of tort” under the STCA, R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-31-1(a).
The Court’s Holding
The Rhode Island Supreme Court answered the certified question in the affirmative. Writing for the Court, Justice Lynch Prata held that RICRA discrimination claims are actions of tort under the STCA, and therefore fall within that statute’s broad waiver of state sovereign immunity. The Court applied the definition of tort articulated in its recent decision in Preserve at Boulder Hills, LLC v. Kenyon, 312 A.3d 475 (R.I. 2024) — a civil wrong constituting an invasion of a private interest for which a plaintiff seeks damages for personal injury — and concluded that a RICRA discrimination claim squarely fits that definition.
The Court reasoned that RICRA created a legal duty and a cause of action for its breach, resulting in injury to the person rather than arising from contract or property law. The plaintiffs’ specific claim — denial of reasonable medical accommodations — was analogized to negligence or medical malpractice, both traditional torts. The Court also drew support from the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974), that civil rights discrimination claims under the Fair Housing Act “sound basically in tort.” The Court emphasized that whether a RICRA claim sounds in tort is a claim-specific inquiry, not a wholesale categorization of the statute.
Key Takeaways
- RICRA discrimination claims constitute “actions of tort” under the Rhode Island State Tort Claims Act, meaning the state’s broad waiver of sovereign immunity in § 9-31-1(a) applies to such claims.
- The tort analysis is claim-specific: even though RICRA covers some contract-adjacent conduct, a particular claim may still sound in tort based on whether it involves a civil injury to the person rather than a contract or property right.
- The Court relied heavily on Preserve at Boulder Hills and federal precedent from Curtis v. Loether, reinforcing that statutory civil rights claims modeled on tort principles are treated as torts for immunity purposes.
- Justice Robinson concurred reluctantly, writing separately to emphasize that stare decisis — particularly Preserve — compelled his agreement, though without enthusiasm.
Why It Matters
This decision resolves a previously open question of Rhode Island law with significant practical consequences: state agencies and political subdivisions cannot invoke sovereign immunity to shield themselves from RICRA discrimination suits. Plaintiffs alleging disability, race, sex, religion, age, or national-origin discrimination by state actors in Rhode Island now have a clearer path to damages in both state and federal court, subject only to the STCA’s monetary caps.
The ruling also has broader structural importance for civil rights litigation. By confirming that discrimination claims sound in tort for immunity-waiver purposes, the Court aligns Rhode Island with federal doctrine and removes a procedural barrier that could otherwise render RICRA’s protections illusory against the very government actors most likely to wield institutional power over vulnerable populations, including incarcerated individuals.