Background
Charles Senegal sued Acadian Ambulance Services, Inc., for personal injuries sustained in a May 2, 2022 collision on Johnston Street in Lafayette. Senegal was traveling in the same direction as an Acadian ambulance when its driver, Jason Morgan, swerved from his lane and made a left U-turn while responding to an emergency. The ambulance struck Senegal’s vehicle and propelled it across two lanes of oncoming traffic. Senegal’s vehicle was a total loss. Acadian compensated him for the vehicle, and he sought damages for his personal injuries.
Acadian asserted qualified immunity under La.R.S. 32:24, maintaining that Morgan was responding to an emergency and had activated the ambulance’s lights and siren. It denied gross negligence and moved for summary judgment on August 7, 2025, arguing that liability required reckless disregard for the safety of others and that Morgan’s conduct did not meet that standard.
At the hearing, Senegal’s attorney was absent and had not timely filed an opposition. Court personnel contacted her office, and her secretary delivered an opposition brief to the trial court’s law clerk while the court was in recess. When the hearing resumed, the trial court granted summary judgment, stating that an opposition had not been timely filed. The judgment dismissed Senegal’s claims with prejudice. Senegal’s attorney later sought a new trial or reconsideration, explaining that she had been hospitalized for a medical emergency, underwent two cardiac surgical procedures, and was released to home nursing care and rehabilitation. She supplied a surgeon’s statement supporting that account. After the motion was denied, Senegal appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Third Circuit reversed. Reviewing the summary judgment de novo under the same criteria governing the trial court, the court explained that the movant retains the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. The court may not weigh evidence, and doubts must be resolved in the nonmoving party’s favor.
The court addressed La.R.S. 32:24’s emergency-vehicle provisions. Under the statute and Lenard v. Dilley, the heightened reckless-disregard standard applies only when the driver’s conduct satisfies subsections A, B, and C. Otherwise, ordinary negligence governs. Reckless disregard is equivalent to gross negligence and is more severe than negligent conduct. Whether the driver’s conduct should be evaluated under reckless disregard or ordinary negligence is a question for the trier of fact.
Acadian’s own evidence created a factual issue preventing summary judgment. Its employee Chavo Eglin acknowledged that Morgan checked his rear-view mirror but did not turn to look for nearby vehicles before beginning the U-turn, despite the ambulance’s blind spot. Eglin could not confirm use of a turn signal and agreed that Morgan commenced the turn when activating the lights and siren. He also reported telling Morgan that he could use an adjacent vacant parking lot to turn around, but the collision occurred before he finished. Senegal testified that he was traveling 45 miles per hour, was parallel to the ambulance when it turned into his car, and did not see a turn signal or lights or hear a siren beforehand. The investigating officer identified careless operation and inattentiveness as contributing factors, although Morgan received no ticket. On these facts, the court held that a trier of fact could resolve whether Morgan’s U-turn constituted ordinary negligence or gross negligence.
Key Takeaways
- The appellate court reversed the dismissal of Senegal’s personal-injury claims because Acadian’s evidence did not establish entitlement to summary judgment.
- La.R.S. 32:24’s reckless-disregard standard is conditional on satisfying subsections A through C; the applicable standard of care can present a fact question.
- The court relied on unresolved evidence concerning the timing of the U-turn and warning signals, the unchecked blind spot, and the available parking-lot alternative.
- The trial court’s failure to provide factual reasons under La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(C)(4), and its apparent reliance on the untimely opposition, did not replace the appellate court’s independent de novo review.
Why It Matters
The decision illustrates that an emergency responder’s invocation of statutory protections does not automatically resolve liability at summary judgment. Evidence supplied by the movant itself may leave material disputes about the driver’s conduct and the governing standard of care.
The court also distinguished procedural shortcomings from the merits. Although the trial court’s lack of factual reasons may have delayed justice, it did not cause irreparable harm because the appellate court reviewed the summary-judgment record de novo. The court assessed all costs associated with the summary-judgment motion and appeal to Acadian.