Background
Richard J. Johnson, the relator, filed an original proceeding in the Ninth Court of Appeals seeking a writ of mandamus and temporary relief against the County Court at Law No. 3 of Montgomery County, Texas. He contended that the Montgomery County court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over a suit filed by the Department of Family and Protective Services (“the Department”) seeking to terminate his parental rights to S.J., and that the trial court abused its discretion by acting in a case that had not been properly transferred from the court of continuing jurisdiction.
According to the relator’s own account, the Department first filed a termination suit in Anderson County on September 17, 2024, and that suit was transferred to Navarro County. No trial commenced before the dismissal date passed. The Department then filed a new termination suit in Montgomery County on June 5, 2026. On June 18, 2026, the Navarro County court signed an order “attempting to dismiss or transfer” the Navarro County case. The next day, June 19, 2026, the Montgomery County trial court signed temporary orders in Trial Cause No. 26-06-09642. Johnson filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and a plea in abatement on June 25, 2026, which the trial court denied at a July 2, 2026 hearing.
Johnson argued that the Navarro County court was the court of continuing jurisdiction by operation of Chapter 155 of the Texas Family Code. He also argued that the dismissal date for the Department’s earlier suit passed without a trial having commenced, so the Navarro County court’s jurisdiction automatically terminated under Family Code section 263.401(a), which provides that unless the court has commenced trial on the merits or granted an extension, on the first Monday after the first anniversary of the temporary order appointing the department as temporary managing conservator, the court’s jurisdiction over the suit terminates and the suit is automatically dismissed without a court order.
The Court’s Holding
The court of appeals, in a per curiam memorandum opinion, denied the petition for writ of mandamus and any request for temporary relief. The court recited the familiar mandamus standard: a writ may issue to remedy a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court when the relator lacks an adequate remedy by appeal, citing In re Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding), and Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839-40 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding).
Applying that standard, the court concluded that Johnson “has not shown that he is entitled to mandamus relief.” The opinion does not elaborate on the specific basis for rejecting his jurisdictional arguments; it simply holds that the relator failed to carry his burden under the mandamus standard. The court denied the petition and any requests for temporary relief under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 52.8(a) and 52.10, and denied all pending motions.
Key Takeaways
- The Ninth Court of Appeals denied a father’s mandamus petition challenging a Montgomery County trial court’s jurisdiction over a Department of Family and Protective Services termination suit, concluding he failed to show entitlement to mandamus relief.
- The relator argued the Navarro County court was the court of continuing jurisdiction under Family Code Chapter 155 and that its jurisdiction had automatically terminated under section 263.401(a) when the dismissal date passed without trial commencing.
- The court applied the established mandamus framework requiring a clear abuse of discretion and no adequate appellate remedy, and found the relator did not satisfy it, without issuing an extended analysis of the underlying jurisdictional dispute.
- The petition, all requests for temporary relief, and all pending motions were denied under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 52.8(a) and 52.10.
Why It Matters
The decision illustrates the demanding burden a relator faces in using mandamus to attack a trial court’s jurisdiction in a termination-of-parental-rights case, even where the relator raises statutory arguments under the Family Code’s continuing-jurisdiction and automatic-dismissal provisions. Practitioners should note that the court resolved the petition on the ground that the relator failed to demonstrate entitlement to relief under the Prudential/Walker standard, rather than by issuing a detailed merits ruling on the Chapter 155 and section 263.401(a) questions.
The case also underscores the procedural complexity that arises when a department suit is dismissed or transferred between counties and a new termination suit is filed elsewhere, and it signals that intermediate appellate courts may decline to intervene by mandamus in such disputes absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion and the inadequacy of appeal.