Background
Maya Jones was indicted by a Terrebonne Parish grand jury in August 2022 for first-degree murder and obstruction of justice arising from the death of her two-year-old son. The State initially filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty, though it later withdrew that notice. As an indigent defendant, Jones sought state funding for a community-polling expert to support a change-of-venue motion, arguing that without such an expert her counsel would be constitutionally ineffective. She applied to the Office of the State Public Defender (OSPD) under the Louisiana Capital Defense Guidelines, but her request — and a subsequent request for reconsideration — were both denied.
The district court held a series of hearings and found that Jones had satisfied the Touchet standard, meaning expert assistance was necessary to the construction of an effective defense. Despite that finding, the court concluded it was legally barred from ordering payment by La. R.S. 15:168(E)(3), which flatly provides that “[n]o court shall have jurisdiction to order the payment of any funds administered by the office or district public defender for expert witnesses, or for any other reason.” Jones then moved to have that provision declared unconstitutional. The district court agreed, holding the statute violated Louisiana Constitution Article 5, § 16(A)’s grant of exclusive original jurisdiction over felony cases to district courts, and also stripped defendants of due process. The State and the Attorney General took a direct appeal to the Louisiana Supreme Court.
The appeal presented a single question: whether La. R.S. 15:168(E)(3) is facially unconstitutional. Two justices dissented; two additional justices wrote separately.
The Court’s Holding
The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings, holding La. R.S. 15:168(E)(3) unconstitutional. Writing for the majority, Justice Hughes grounded the analysis in the separation-of-powers framework established by Louisiana Constitution Articles 2 and 5. The court reiterated that Article 5, § 16(A) gives district courts exclusive original jurisdiction over felony cases, and that this provision “effectively limits the powers of the Legislature and precludes the Legislature from changing the original jurisdiction of district courts fixed by the Constitution,” citing Pope v. State, 792 So.2d 713 (La. 2001). The statute’s categorical prohibition on any court ordering payment from OSPD funds was found to impermissibly erode that exclusive jurisdiction by denying courts the ability to ensure that indigent defendants receive the basic tools of an adequate defense.
The court drew on a long line of Louisiana precedent establishing the judiciary’s inherent power to secure effective assistance of counsel for indigent defendants. Beginning with State in the Interest of Johnson (1985) and continued through State v. Craig (1994) and State v. Touchet (1994), the court has consistently recognized that “even in the absence of legislative or executive authorization, a court may, when reasonably necessary, appoint counsel for an indigent and award the attorney a reasonable fee to be paid from a source which the court deems appropriate,” and that this authority extends to investigators and expert witnesses. While the Legislature may designate which entity bears financial responsibility for indigent defense costs, it cannot enact a statute that entirely eliminates judicial oversight of funding decisions and leaves an indigent defendant with no remedy — particularly where, as here, sufficient funds exist. La. R.S. 15:168(E)(3) crossed that line.
Key Takeaways
- La. R.S. 15:168(E)(3), which prohibited any court from ordering payment of OSPD or district public defender funds for expert witnesses, is unconstitutional on its face as a violation of Louisiana Constitution Article 5, § 16(A) and the separation-of-powers doctrine.
- District courts retain inherent constitutional authority to order state funding for expert witnesses when an indigent defendant establishes necessity under the Touchet standard, regardless of a legislative prohibition purporting to strip that jurisdiction.
- The Legislature may lawfully designate which governmental body bears the cost of indigent defense, but it may not eliminate the courts’ power to enforce funding obligations necessary to guarantee effective assistance of counsel.
- The State v. Citizen remedy of halting prosecution until funding is found is not the exclusive or adequate remedy where sufficient funds exist and no court can order their disbursement.
Why It Matters
This decision reaffirms the outer limit of legislative authority over Louisiana’s public defender system. While the court has long permitted the Legislature to restructure funding mechanisms and shift financial responsibility among state agencies, Jones makes clear that a statute eliminating judicial review of indigent-defense funding decisions entirely is a constitutional bridge too far. Trial courts in capital and serious felony cases now have confirmed authority — grounded in both the state constitution and inherent judicial power — to compel the OSPD to fund expert services when defendants make the requisite showing, notwithstanding statutory language to the contrary.
For defense practitioners, the ruling provides a direct enforcement mechanism when the OSPD denies expert funding requests in cases where the Touchet standard is met. For the Legislature and OSPD, it signals that any future statutory scheme restricting judicial oversight of expert funding must preserve some avenue for judicial review or risk a similar constitutional fate.