Background
On July 5, 2023, Baltimore City detectives were riding in an unmarked vehicle when they spotted Steven Hicks walking near a street corner. Detective Mitchell Ramsey observed the outline of a handgun “printing” through Hicks’s t-shirt—the angular shape of the rear handle visible beneath the fabric. The detectives stopped Hicks and placed him in handcuffs. Hicks immediately—and repeatedly—told the officers he had a permit to carry the weapon and asked to produce it. The officers declined, stating they had “an investigation to conduct.”
While Hicks stood handcuffed and surrounded by four officers, Detective Alex Rodriguez removed the holstered handgun from Hicks’s waistband and then reached into Hicks’s cross-body satchel, announcing a second firearm inside. Officers also pulled a bag of cocaine from Hicks’s pants pocket. Hicks did in fact possess a valid Maryland concealed-carry permit—one later recovered from his satchel and stipulated authentic by the State. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City denied Hicks’s motion to suppress, finding the officers acted reasonably for public safety. Hicks entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of a firearm with a nexus to a drug trafficking crime and was sentenced to five years without parole. He timely appealed.
The case drew the attention of the full court: after a three-judge panel heard argument in February 2026, a majority of the Appellate Court of Maryland voted to hear the matter in banc. All fourteen judges sat for argument on March 31, 2026. The core question was whether, after New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), the mere sight of a person carrying a firearm still gives police reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop in Maryland.
The Court’s Holding
Bruen fundamentally altered the landscape. The Supreme Court held that the Second and Fourteenth Amendments protect an individual’s right to carry a handgun for self-defense outside the home, and that public carry is presumptively lawful. In direct response, Maryland converted its licensing regime from “may issue” (requiring applicants to show “good and substantial reason”) to a “shall issue” scheme, effective October 1, 2023. Under current Maryland law, any qualified adult who completes the required training and clears a background check is entitled to a carry permit. Writing for the in banc court, Judge Graeff held that this transformation controls the Fourth Amendment analysis: because gun carry is now a constitutionally protected and broadly permitted activity in Maryland, an officer who observes nothing more than a person carrying a firearm—visibly or concealed—lacks reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The mere possibility that the person might not have a valid permit is insufficient; the police must articulate specific, objective facts suggesting this person is carrying the gun illegally or is otherwise engaged in criminal activity. The court drew support from the Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in United States v. Wilson, 143 F.4th 647 (5th Cir. 2025), and the Illinois Appellate Court’s ruling in People v. Dorsey, 266 N.E.3d 1209 (Ill. App. Ct. 2025), both of which reached the same conclusion post-Bruen.
On the frisk question, the court rejected Hicks’s broader argument that Bruen bars a Terry frisk whenever the suspect is carrying a gun lawfully. A firearm is dangerous regardless of whether it is carried legally or illegally; if there had been a valid stop, the officers would have had reasonable suspicion to pat down an armed suspect for officer safety. But the court also held that the officers here exceeded the lawful scope of a Terry frisk. A pat-down is limited to the outer surface of clothing; reaching into a bag or pocket requires the officer to first establish, through a pat-down, that an item inside is a weapon—or to satisfy the plain-feel or plain-view doctrines. Detective Rodriguez, who actually conducted the frisk and made the critical discoveries, did not testify at the suppression hearing. Without his testimony, the State could not meet its burden of showing what he observed inside the satchel before reaching in, or that the cocaine in Hicks’s pocket was “immediately apparent” as contraband during a pat-down. The court reversed the judgment and directed that the suppression motion be granted.
Key Takeaways
- In Maryland, the sight of a person openly or concealed-carrying a firearm—standing alone—does not give police reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop; officers must articulate specific facts indicating the particular individual is carrying illegally or is engaged in criminal activity.
- Post-Bruen, a lawfully armed suspect who is properly stopped may still be frisked for weapons: the right to carry does not make the carrier non-dangerous, and officer-safety frisks remain constitutionally permissible incident to a valid stop.
- The scope of a Terry frisk is strictly limited to a pat-down of outer clothing; reaching into bags and pockets requires additional legal justification, and the State bears the burden of adducing testimony—from the officer who actually conducted the search—to support plain-feel or plain-view claims.
- Drug and firearm evidence recovered during an unlawful stop or an over-scope frisk must be suppressed; the inevitable-discovery doctrine does not rescue a search when the State has not laid the required evidentiary foundation.
Why It Matters
This in banc ruling is the Appellate Court of Maryland’s definitive answer to the post-Bruen Terry-stop question, and it will reshape street-level police-citizen encounters throughout the State. Before Bruen—and before Maryland became a shall-issue state—gun possession was presumptively unlawful, making stops of visibly armed individuals routine and rarely challenged. That era is over. Maryland practitioners defending drug and firearms cases should scrutinize every arrest that originated with an officer’s observation of a weapon: if that observation was the sole or primary basis for the stop, Hicks provides strong grounds for suppression.
For prosecutors and law enforcement, the practical message is equally clear: document factors beyond the firearm—flight, furtive movements, known prior prohibitions, proximity to recent criminal activity, or credible tips of illegal conduct—before initiating a stop. And when an officer conducts a frisk, that officer must be prepared to testify; the State cannot meet its burden through bystander body-camera footage alone. Given the breadth of the in banc panel and the multiple concurrences, Hicks v. State is built to last.