Background
Shortly after giving birth to Zula in 2022, the mother arranged a private adoption through an agency and signed a consent form as required by G.L. c. 210, § 2—a form that states, in capital letters, that the surrender “IS FINAL AND CANNOT BE REVOKED.” Around the same time, the Department of Children and Families (DCF) took custody of Zula’s two older siblings following reports of neglect and abuse. The planned adoption fell through when the father of one of the older siblings was confirmed as Zula’s genetic father, causing the adoption agency to transfer custody of Zula to DCF. Zula was then added to the existing care and protection petition pending in the Juvenile Court under G.L. c. 119, § 24.
The mother filed a motion in the care and protection proceeding to revoke her consent, claiming she had not understood that she was surrendering Zula to any adoptive family, not just the one she had originally chosen. The Juvenile Court motion judge held an evidentiary hearing at which the mother testified and all parties presented argument, but then denied the motion exclusively on jurisdictional grounds: because the consent was executed before Zula was added to the care and protection petition, the motion judge concluded that only the Probate and Family Court could review whether the consent was knowing and voluntary. The motion judge later applied the same reasoning to deny the mother’s motion to approve an open adoption agreement she had negotiated with a new preadoptive family, ruling that the mother lacked standing and the Juvenile Court therefore had no authority to act.
The Court’s Holding
Judge Massing, writing for a unanimous panel (Massing, Ditkoff, and Hand, JJ.), vacated both orders and remanded. The pivotal text is G.L. c. 210, § 1, as amended in 1993: “The district or juvenile court may, if it appears necessary or convenient, exercise the powers authorized by [c. 210], but only in respect to a pending proceeding before such district or juvenile court.” Before the 1992–1993 legislative amendments, jurisdiction over consent revocation resided exclusively in the Probate and Family Court because the Juvenile Court lacked any authority over termination of parental rights or adoption. The Legislature’s enactment of St. 1992, c. 303, and St. 1992, c. 379, § 59, gave Juvenile Court judges authority to enter decrees dispensing with the need for consent in pending care and protection cases, and simultaneously granted Juvenile Court judges general c. 210 powers “in respect to a pending proceeding.”
The court held that the “pending proceeding” requirement refers to the time the motion is filed, not the time the consent was executed. The statute’s language “is clear and unambiguous” and contains no limiting language tying Juvenile Court jurisdiction to the date the consent form was signed. The court contrasted G.L. c. 209C, § 3(c), which expressly conditions Juvenile Court parentage jurisdiction on the care and protection proceeding having been “initiated before” the parentage complaint—language conspicuously absent from § 1. The court also emphasized the statute’s flexible triggering standard (“necessary or convenient”), which “resists the application of a strict timeline.” Because Zula was the subject of a pending care and protection petition when the mother moved to revoke her consent, the Juvenile Court had jurisdiction under § 1 to inquire whether that consent was knowing and voluntary under Adoption of Thomas, 408 Mass. 446, 450–451 (1990).
On the open adoption agreement, the court held that G.L. c. 210, § 6C, refers to “birth parents” without imposing any formal standing requirement, and that the judge who will enter the adoption decree is the judge with authority to approve an open adoption agreement under that decree. Because any adoption decree for Zula would be entered by the Juvenile Court judge presiding over the care and protection case, that judge—not the Probate and Family Court—had authority to act on the mother’s motion and on the joint motion filed by DCF and counsel for the child.
Key Takeaways
- The Juvenile Court has jurisdiction under G.L. c. 210, § 1, to hear a birth parent’s motion to revoke adoption consent under § 2 whenever a care and protection case for that child is pending—regardless of whether the consent was executed before or after the care and protection petition was initiated.
- The 1992–1993 amendments integrated G.L. c. 210 adoption powers into the Juvenile Court’s care and protection jurisdiction; earlier cases requiring Probate and Family Court consent proceedings (e.g., Adoption of Thomas; Adoption of Derrick, 415 Mass. 439 (1993)) were decided under the pre-1993 statutory framework and do not compel parallel proceedings today.
- The Juvenile Court also has authority under G.L. c. 210, § 6C, to approve open adoption agreements reached between birth parents and preadoptive families—even when the birth parent lacks formal standing in the underlying care and protection case—because § 6C speaks of “birth parents” without a standing prerequisite, and the judge entering the adoption decree has the approval power.
- Once an evidentiary hearing has been held, failure to exercise available jurisdiction creates “undesirable and unnecessary delays” in the finalization of the child’s adoption; the Juvenile Court judge should adjudicate the consent revocation motion on the existing record rather than deferring to a separate Probate and Family Court proceeding.
Why It Matters
Adoption of Zula resolves a jurisdictional question that has lurked in Massachusetts care and protection litigation since the 1993 statutory amendments: must a birth parent who executed a private adoption consent before DCF filed a care and protection petition pursue consent revocation in the Probate and Family Court, or may the motion be heard in the Juvenile Court where the protection case is pending? The Appeals Court’s answer is unambiguous—the Juvenile Court’s jurisdiction under G.L. c. 210, § 1, turns on whether a proceeding for the child is pending when the motion is filed, not on when the consent was signed. Practitioners handling care and protection cases that intersect with pre-petition private adoptions should file consent revocation motions in the pending Juvenile Court proceeding rather than commencing a parallel Probate and Family Court action, avoiding inconsistent decrees from two courts adjudicating the same child’s status.
For DCF counsel, guardians ad litem, and preadoptive family attorneys, the decision also clarifies the forum for open adoption agreement approval: bring § 6C motions before the Juvenile Court judge who will enter the adoption decree. Conducting all related proceedings before a single judge—who has already heard evidence on parental fitness and the child’s best interests—promotes efficiency and reduces the risk of conflicting orders across departments of the Trial Court.