Background
K.D.F. and D.M.F. were married for twelve years before K.D.F. filed for divorce in November 2024. The couple had agreed to co-parent their children under a “nesting agreement,” alternating time in the marital home. However, before the arrangement could begin, K.D.F. sought an ex parte abuse prevention order under G.L. c. 209A, alleging she feared imminent serious physical harm from D.M.F. A District Court judge issued the order, which among other provisions required D.M.F. to refrain from “engaging in any coercively controlling behavior” as defined under the statute.
At a two-party hearing on April 22, 2025, K.D.F. testified to a pattern of escalating aggression by D.M.F. following the divorce filing. She described incidents in which D.M.F. blocked her in a closet during a disagreement, slammed his fist on a counter inches from her while threatening “if you poke the bear, I’m going to come get you,” cornered her and slammed his fist near her on another occasion, punched the back of a couch hard enough to shake it while she sat on it, blocked her in a bathroom while making financial threats, and followed her through the house while stating “you’re going to get what you deserve” and “I’m going to come for you.” K.D.F. testified she had an “immediate fear for my life” and had never been “so terrified.” The judge credited K.D.F.’s testimony and extended the order for one year.
D.M.F. appealed, arguing that K.D.F. failed to prove abuse based on either a reasonable fear of imminent serious physical harm or “coercive control” — a category of abuse newly added to the statute by the 2024 amendment. Coercive control, as defined by St. 2024, c. 118, which amended the Massachusetts Abuse Prevention Act, is “a pattern of behavior intended to threaten, intimidate, harass, isolate, control, coerce or compel compliance of a family or household member that causes that family or household member to reasonably fear physical harm or have a reduced sense of physical safety or autonomy.” D.M.F. also raised several due process challenges to the hearing proceedings.
The Court’s Holding
The Appeals Court affirmed the extension of the abuse prevention order. Writing in a summary decision pursuant to Rule 23.0, the panel (Vuono, Ditkoff, and D’Angelo, JJ.) concluded that K.D.F.’s credited testimony was sufficient to establish that she reasonably feared imminent serious physical harm — making it unnecessary to reach the question of whether coercive control was independently established.
The court emphasized that a history or specific incident of actual physical violence is not required to support a finding of reasonable fear of imminent serious physical harm. Citing Constance C. v. Raymond R., 101 Mass. App. Ct. 390 (2022), the court explained that the relevant inquiry focuses on “the actions and words of the defendant in light of the attendant circumstances.” D.M.F.’s increasingly volatile behavior, escalating anger, physical intimidation tactics, and explicit verbal threats were sufficient to warrant a reasonable person in fearing for her personal safety.
The court also rejected D.M.F.’s due process arguments. While acknowledging that the judge had “prematurely expressed her intention to extend the order,” the court found she recognized her mistake and proceeded to hear D.M.F.’s testimony. The court was not persuaded that the judge improperly shifted the burden of proof or that her “unwarranted impatience” toward D.M.F. rose to the level of a due process violation. The court further noted that because the order was properly supported on the imminent-physical-harm ground, it was irrelevant whether D.M.F. had adequate notice that K.D.F. would also rely on coercive control.
Key Takeaways
- Physical violence is not a prerequisite: A pattern of intimidating conduct — blocking exits, slamming fists near someone, making verbal threats — can establish objectively reasonable fear of imminent serious physical harm sufficient for a c. 209A order, even absent any history of physical contact.
- Credibility determinations receive utmost deference: Appellate courts accord the “utmost deference” to credibility findings by the judge who observed the parties, reinforcing the importance of live testimony at extension hearings.
- Coercive control question left open: The court expressly declined to reach the question of whether the evidence satisfied the new coercive control definition or whether “emotional abuse” falls within the statutory framework — leaving these issues for future litigation.
- Procedural imperfections do not automatically equal due process violations: A judge’s premature statements or impatience, when corrected, do not necessarily deprive a party of a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
Why It Matters
This decision is among the earliest Appeals Court rulings to address the 2024 amendment to the Massachusetts Abuse Prevention Act (St. 2024, c. 118), which expanded the definition of abuse to include coercive control. While the court ultimately did not need to interpret the new provision — resolving the case on the traditional fear-of-imminent-harm ground — the opinion highlights how the coercive control framework is beginning to shape c. 209A proceedings. The inclusion of a coercive-control provision in the original ex parte order and the judge’s sua sponte invocation of the concept at the two-party hearing suggest that courts are already engaging with this new statutory tool.
For practitioners, the case underscores two practical lessons. First, litigants seeking 209A protection should continue to build strong records on the traditional grounds of abuse even when coercive control may also be present, as courts may prefer to rely on established precedent. Second, the court’s refusal to decide whether “emotional abuse” qualifies as coercive control signals that the boundaries of the new provision remain unsettled, making it an area ripe for further appellate development.